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INTRODUCTION
An investor who buys shares on a stock exchange receives a
piece of equity of the listed company. 2 Typically, the listed
company is either an operating company or a holding company
that owns an equity stake in an operating company or
companies.3 This, however, is not true of half of the businesses
domiciled in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) that are
listed in the United States using the Variable Interest Entity
(“VIE”) structure. 4 Under a VIE structure, a US investor
purchases shares in an offshore entity, typically a shell company
domiciled in the Cayman Islands, which owns neither a revenue2. See, e.g., Stock Market Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/stock%20exchange (last visited Dec. 19, 2013) (“A system or
place where shares of various companies are bought and sold”); Equity Market
Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/equitymarket.asp
(last visited Dec. 19, 2013) (defining the stock market as giving companies capital and
investors a slice of ownership in a company).
3. See, e.g., Holding Company Definition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 257 (9th ed.
2009) (characterizing a holding company as a company formed to control other
companies and confines its role to owning stock and supervising management without
participating in making day-to-day business decisions); HERVÉ STOLOWY & MICHEL
LEBAS, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING, A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 454 (2006)
(noting that a pure holding company’s sole purpose is to hold and manage its
subsidiaries and does not directly engage in business operations).
4. See Wong, supra note 1 (suggesting that more than half of the 200 Chinese
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and the NASDAQ Stock
Market (“NASDAQ”) use a Variable Interest Entity (“VIE”) structure); Paul Gillis,
Statistics on VIE Usage, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Apr. 11, 2011, 7:20 PM), http://
www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/statistics-on-vie-usage.html (noting that about
forty-seven percent and sixty-five percent of the Chinese businesses that went public on
the NYSE and NASDAQ, respectively, used the VIE structure); David Schindelheim,
Note, Variable Interest Entity Structures in the People’s Republic of China: Is Uncertainty for
Foreign Investors Part of China’s Economic Development Plan?, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 195, 196 (2012) (explaining that foreign control is established over a PRC
entity through contractual arrangement rather than equity ownership).
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generating business operation nor equity in an operating
company.5 The investor derives economic benefits solely from
the contractual agreements between the listed entity and the
underlying PRC-domiciled business.6 As such, a VIE investment
is only as good as the validity of its underlying contracts.7 The
combined market capitalization of US-listed PRC-domiciled VIEs
was nearly US$100 billion as of September 2012, and is expected
to reach US$300 billion by the end of 2014.8
The VIE structure of PRC-domiciled businesses was created
in 2000 to circumvent the PRC government’s restrictions barring
non-PRC ownership of PRC companies in certain “sensitive”
5 . See, e.g., NetEase Inc., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 22, 2013)
(documenting the places of incorporation to be in the Cayman Islands and principle
executive offices in the PRC); RenRen Inc., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 23,
2013); Sina Corp., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 22, 2013). But see Chen Ke, “Rule
by Law” and Its Impact on Cross-Border Transactions Affecting Chinese Interests, 34 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 161, 166 (2011) (acknowledging the British Virgin Islands to be the
other common destination for VIE shell companies).
6. See Understanding the VIE Structure: Necessary Elements for Success, and the Legal
Risks Involved, CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT 2 (Aug. 10, 2011),
http://www.cadwalader.com/uploads/cfmemos/a6415b15f2ab1795be964c203f
513215.pdf [hereinafter CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure] (“The key
concept that underpins a VIE Structure is control over the Domestic Licensed Co
through various service agreements . . . rather than through share ownership.”); Dune
Lawrence, China Companies Evading Owner Rule with US Listings Frustrate Regulators,
BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 9, 2011), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/legal-news/chinacompanies-evading (“Under U.S. accounting rules, the company in China is considered
a ‘variable interest entity’ in which the U.S.- listed firm’s interest derives from the
contractual relationship, not voting rights.”).
7. See Dan Harris, Crouching Tiger, Hidden Fraud. Clear Speaking On VIEs., CHINA L.
BLOG (July 16, 2011), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2011/07/crouching_tiger_
hidden_fraud_clear_speaking_on_vies.html
(“[T]he
contractual
arrangements
providing for control by the public company are only as strong as the enforcement
mechanisms that can be effectively used – generally Chinese law and Chinese courts.”);
William McGovern, SEC Probe Raises Uncertainty Over VIE Structures, S. CHINA MORNING
POST (Jan. 23, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/
article/1133845/sec-probe-raises-uncertainty-over-vie-structures (cautioning about the
enforceability of the VIE agreements connecting the foreign-owned offshore entity and
the onshore operating VIE owned by PRC nationals).
8. See Paul Gillis, Accounting Matters: Variable Interest Entities in China, FORENSIC
ASIA GUEST SERIES (Sept. 18, 2011) (listing over one hundred US-listed PRC-domiciled
companies in descending order of market capitalization as of September 2011); Vindu
Goel, Michael J. de la Merced & Neil Gough, Chinese Giant Alibaba Will Go Public, Listing
in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2014, 4:48 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/
06/alibaba-files-to-go-public-in-the-u-s (confirming that PRC’s “e-commerce behemoth”
Alibaba Group has filed with the SEC for its IPO in New York and is expected by the
market to be valued at roughly US$200 billion).
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industry sectors, such as energy, technology, and value-added
telecommunications.9 Notably, almost all of the largest US-listed
PRC-domiciled internet companies use the VIE structure.10 To
date, the PRC government has not directly addressed either the
legality of the VIE structure or the validity of its underlying
contracts.11 Nevertheless, recent actions by the PRC’s regulatory
bodies have significantly exacerbated concerns over the
structure’s fundamental viability.12 The murky legal and political
landscape surrounding VIEs poses unusual challenges to the
protection of US investor interests.13

9. See McGovern, supra note 9 (“Under Chinese law, certain industries—such as
energy, technology and telecommunications—are considered sensitive, and companies
are prevented from issuing stock to foreign investors. Some mainland companies
operating in these sectors have adopted the VIE structure to gain access to foreign
capital.”); Richard Pearson, Looking at Chinese VIE’s, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardpearson/2012/10/18/looking-at-chinese-vies
(“Variable Interest Entity . . . structures were first introduced by Chinese companies
listing in the US as far back as the year 2000 when SINA had its initial public offering
on the NASDAQ.”).
10. See David Barboza, A Loophole Poses Risks to Investors in Chinese Companies, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 23, 2012, 5:38 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/aloophole-poses-risks-to-investors-in-chinese-companies (pointing out that almost every
major Chinese internet company has adopted the VIE structure); Sunny Ye, The Cash
Reserves of China’s Internet Companies, TECHRICE (Oct. 2, 2011), http://techrice.com/
2011/10/02/chinas-internet-companies-ranked-by-cash-on-hand (listing the twentyseven largest overseas-listed PRC-domiciled VIEs in the internet business in terms of
cash reserves, with US-listed NetEase and Baidu in top spots).
11. See generally Stan Abrams, The VIE Meta-Narrative: Illegal vs. Invalid, CHINA
HEARSAY BLOG (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.chinahearsay.com/the-vie-meta-narrative
(distinguishing between the risk of a categorical declaration of the illegality of VIE as a
financing structure and that of invalidation of the VIE contracts); Schindelheim, supra
note 4, at 225 (arguing that the uncertainty is part of the CCP’s deliberate plan).
12. See Gillis, supra note 8 (“There is a growing feeling that VIEs are becoming
unworkable.”); An Update on China’s Variable Interest Entities: Navigating Regulations and
Mitigating Risks for 2013, K&L GATES, (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.klgates.com/anupdate-on-chinas-variable-interest-entities—navigating-regulations-and-mitigating-risksfor-2013-03-08-2013 (suggesting that the PRC government’s recent actions show its
intention to crack down on VIEs).
13. See Steven M. Davidoff, Alibaba Investors Will Buy a Risky Corporate Structure, N.Y.
TIMES (May 6, 2014, 7:46 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/i-p-orevives-debate-over-a-chinese-structure (“The structure may be illegal under Chinese
law since it conveniently circumvents those prohibitions on foreign investment.”);
Dena Aubin, Investor Risk Lurks in Legal Structure of China IPOs–Lawyers, REUTERS (Nov.
2, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/23/china-investments-idUSL2N0E
MPD20130623 (presenting the possible nightmare scenario, where the listed company
loses control of the PRC firm’s assets, essentially wiping out its balance).
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Part I of this Comment discusses the policy background,
historical origin, common configuration, and the PRC’s current
regulatory regime of the VIE structure. Part I also provides a
brief overview of the role of the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) in regulating publicly-held VIEs in the
United States. Part II examines the inherent legal and regulatory
risks of investing in VIE entities and the limited legal recourse
afforded to VIE investors. Part III recommends two regulatory
actions the SEC may consider taking to better inform the
investing public in the nature of VIEs. For the sake of focus and
brevity, in this Comment, the term “PRC” refers only to
mainland China, and the term “VIE” means only those variable
interest entity structures that involve PRC-domiciled businesses
publicly traded in the United States.14
I. THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
Part I introduces the historical background that gave rise to
the invention and popularity of VIEs and discusses its current
regulatory environment. Part I.A examines the early days of the
PRC’s foreign direct investment (“FDI”) policy, and the
emergence of the industry-based investment restriction scheme
of the 1970s as a direct result of the PRC’s Open-Door Policy.
Part I.B investigates the rise and demise of the VIE’s
predecessor, the China-China-Foreign (“CCF”) investment
structure, and the subsequent rise of the VIE structure since
2000. It also analyzes the typical structure of a VIE arrangement
and the motives of its various participants. Part I.C reviews the
PRC’s recent legislative and regulatory developments as well as
the ongoing bilateral treaty negotiation affecting the VIE
structure. Part I.D briefly addresses the regulatory role of the
SEC in the US capital markets, particularly in relation to VIEs.

14 . See Mainland China, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mainland_
China (last visited on Feb. 26, 2014) (“[A] geographical and political term to describe
the geographical area under the direct jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) [that] generally excludes the PRC Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong
and Macau”); Contra Variable Interest Entity—VIE, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/terms/v/variable-interest-entity.asp (last visited on Dec. 19,
2013) (defining VIE as any entity in which the investor has obtained less than a
majority interest that is subject to consolidation if certain conditions exist).
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A. Long-Held Policy of the People’s Republic of China: Restriction on
Foreign Ownership in “Sensitive” Industries
The PRC operates in a self-defined “socialist market
economy” under the unitary rule of the Chinese Communist
Party (“CCP”).15 During the Maoist era (1949–78), FDI in the
PRC was practically non-existent.16 Historically, the dominant
Confucian ideology had an anti-commercial tradition and
assigned low social status to merchants.17 More recently, in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the PRC was colonized and
exploited by Western military invasion and forced trade. 18
Consequently, the newly-founded PRC felt intense hostility
toward the West and a strong desire to regain autonomy of its
trade and commerce.19 Self-reliance via import substitution was a
15. XIANFA pmbl. & art. 11 (1982) (China); see Vivienne Bath, Foreign Investment,
the National Interest and National Security—Foreign Direct Investment in Australia and China,
34 SYDNEY L. REV. 5, 6 (2012) (“China is a one-party unitary state which describes itself
as being in ‘the primary stage of socialism’ and aiming to develop a ‘socialist market
economy’.”). But see George Finch, Modern Chinese Constitutionalism: Reflections of
Economic Change, 15 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 75, 94–102 (2007) (noting
that the term did not appear in the PRC Constitution under its 1993 amendment to
follow Deng Xiaoping’s call to introduce market economy into China).
16. See Jinyan Li, The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for
International Tax Debates (Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy Research
Paper 05/2008, Vol. 04 No. 01, 2008) (“China had no foreign direct investment
(“FDI”) before 1979.”); Stefan Kaiser et al., Foreign Direct Investment in China: An
Examination of the Literature, in GREATER CHINA: POLITICAL ECONOMY, INWARD
INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS CULTURE 44 (Chris Rowley & Mark Lewis eds., 1996)
(noting that FDI was allowed into the PRC with the announcement of the Open-Door
policy).
17. See XUEYUAN ZHANG ET AL., HISTORICAL ATTITUDES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
PATH DEPENDENCE: FDI DEVELOPMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN CHINA, ERIM
REP. SERIES RES. IN MGMT. 11 (2004) (suggesting that the anti-commercial attitude in
the Confucian Chinese state is related to its “traditional suspicion of merchants”); Four
Occupations, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_occupations (last visited
Dec. 17, 2013) (noting that under the hierarchical system in ancient China, traders and
merchants had the lowest social rank).
18. See Finch, supra note 15, at 77 (providing an overview of the series of
unsuccessful attempts by the Chinese government to fight foreign aggression and
forced trade); HUI FENG, The Road to the WTO, in THE POLITICS OF CHINA’S ACCESSION
TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE DRAGON GOES GLOBAL 40, 41 (2006)
(noting that as a result of China’s defeat in the two Opium Wars the country was forced
to accept a humiliating treaty system under which foreign powers controlled Chinese
tariffs and coastal trade).
19. See ZHANG ET AL., supra note 17, at 14–16 (explaining how the Western
domination and exploitation of China starting with the Opium War has contributed to
Chinese protectionism); Axel Berger, The Politics of China’s Investment Treaty-Making
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resounding theme of the Maoist era.20 The key turning point in
the PRC’s path to modernization occurred after the demise of
Mao Zedong and the disastrous Cultural Revolution.21 In 1978,
in an effort to commence a much-needed economic reform, the
new CCP leadership under Deng Xiaoping instituted the
groundbreaking Open-Door Policy.22 The new policy advocated
the use of “market mechanisms and foreign resources” to spur
economic growth.23 It also marked the first time that the PRC
welcomed non-PRC investments into the country. 24 On the
Program, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS LAW 162, 171 (Tomer Broude
et al. eds., 2011) (discussing the PRC’s hostile view of Western investments as a means
used by the imperialists to carry out “aggression, oppression and exploitation”).
20. See ZHANG ET AL., supra note 17, at 19 (noting that the CCP used the import
substitution approach to achieve its highly-emphasized goal of self-reliance); Import
Substitution Industrialization (“ISI”), INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/i/importsubstitutionindustrialization.asp (last visited on Feb. 24, 2014)
(“Implementation of [import substitution] focuses on protection and incubation of
domestic infant industries so they may emerge to compete with imported goods and
make the local economy more self-sufficient.”); Ross Terrill, China and the World: SelfReliance or Interdependence?, FOREIGN AFF., Jan. 1977, available at http://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/27034/ross-terrill/china-and-the-world-self-reliance-orinterdependence (analyzing the sources of China’s principle of self-reliance from a
historical and cultural standpoint).
21. See, e.g., TANG TSOU, THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND POST-MAO REFORMS: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 144 (1986) (“The Third Plenery session . . . held in
December 1978 may turn out to be the landmark of the beginning of a new historic era
in China.”); Michael Elliot, Thirty Years After Deng: The Man Who Changed China, TIME,
Dec. 10, 2008, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1865539,00.html
(calling the Third Plenery session in 1978 the meeting that “laid the groundwork for a
generation of economic reform”).
22. See Kaiser et al., supra note 16 (examining the evolution of the CCP’s ideology
and policy in the period); Alexander E. Csordas, Note, Funding Entrepreneurial Ventures
in China: Proposals to More Effectively Regulate Chinese Foreign Private Issuers, 38 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 373, 376 (2012) (identifying the emergence of the Open Door Policy following
Mao’s death).
23. William I. Friedman, Alumni Article, One Country, Two Systems: The Inherent
Conflict Between China’s Communist Politics and Capitalist Securities Market, 27 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 477, 477 (2002) (“Deng Xiaoping, adopted an ‘open door’ policy, centering
on economic reforms utilizing market mechanisms and foreign resources to speed up
the growth and modernization of the economy.”); Csordas, supra note 22, at 376
(discussing the central theme of the Open Door Policy).
24. See Yongnian Zheng, Reform, Openness and Social Policy in China, in CHINA’S
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY: INTO THE NEXT STAGE? 19 (Litao Zhao ed., 2013)
(“In the 30 years under Maoist Rule (1949-79), China’s doors were closed to the
outside world, especially the West.”); Jeffrey K.D. Au, Note, The Hopes and Fears of
Foreign Direct Investment: A Comparative Evaluation of FDI Regulation in the People’s
Republic of China and Taiwan, 2 J. CHINESE L. 359, 359 (1988) (“Rejecting past policies
of autarky and strict ‘self-reliance,’ the PRC embarked on a new path, which sought to
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whole, the new leadership welcomed FDI because it attracted
the capital and technical expertise necessary for accelerated
economic growth. 25 FDI-friendly policies have ranged from
preferential tax treatment of overseas investments to special
trade zones for economic experimentation. 26 In the 1990s,
economic reforms accelerated as the “conventional state
planning system” transitioned into “a more market-oriented
macro-economic regulation and control” regime. 27 This
transition continued into the new millennium with the PRC’s
joining the World Trade Organization in 2001.28
While the new CCP leaders in the post-Mao era developed
substantial and enduring policy changes for economic reform,
they did not summarily reverse broad objectives from the
previous era.29 Despite progressive policy changes, protectionism
encourage the transfer of advanced technology from abroad and the investment of
foreign capital in the PRC.”).
25. See, e.g., Ding Qingfen, Favorable FDI Policy is Essential, Says Report, CHINA
DAILY (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-11/30/content_
14186406.htm (commenting on the PRC’s intention to maintain a favorable FDI
environment, as it facilitates the advancement of the nation’s economy); Foreign Direct
Investment—The China Story, WORLD BANK (July 16, 2010), http://www.worldbank.org/
en/news/feature/2010/07/16/foreign-direct-investment-china-story (recognizing the
PRC’s success in mobilizing FDI and achieving economic development and export
success).
26. See, e.g., Zhaodong Jiang, China’s Tax Preferences to Foreign Investment: Policy,
Culture and Modern Concepts, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 549, 550–59 (1998) (outlining a
brief overview of China’s tax preferences for FDI starting in the late 1970s); Associated
Press, China Opens Shanghai Free-Trade Zone, GUARDIAN (London) (Sept. 29, 2013, 7:40
AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/29/china-shanghai-free-tradezone (reporting that the newly established free-trade zone in Shanghai has been billed
by the PRC government as a major step for financial reforms and economic
experimentation).
27. Shen Wei, Dark Past, Grey Present or Bright Future?—Foreign Investors’ Access to
China’s Telecommunications Industry and a Political Economy Analysis of Recent Industrial
Policy Moves, J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 513, 514–15 (2012) (“The entire 1990s witnessed
differential liberalization dominance as well as a departure from the conventional state
planning system of the old days to a more market-oriented macro-economic regulation
and control.”); see ZHANG ET AL., supra note 17, at 3 (“In 1990s, China has absorbed
about half of the FDI inflows into all developing countries.”).
28. See Shen, supra note 27, at 519 (arguing that the PRC’s joining the WTO
ushered further liberalization and modernization of its economy); ZHANG ET AL., supra
note 17, at 9 (timeline of key developments from 1978 to 2001).
29 . See, e.g., Schindelheim, supra note 4, at 198 (characterizing the PRC
government’s current attitude toward foreign investments as “cautious and
protectionist”); Edward M. Graham & Erika Wada, Foreign Direct Investment in China:
Effects on Growth and Economic Performance (Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 0103, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=300884
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has persisted partly in the form of regulatory restrictions of nonPRC investments in a variety of industries. 30 The disparate
treatment of PRC and non-PRC investments has been a
longstanding policy of the CCP and is expected to persist in the
foreseeable future.31 Further, some believe that the CCP may be
contemplating a return to a more protectionist regime—fueled
by growing nationalist pride and a push to keep homegrown
companies under the PRC’s control.32
Since its promulgation in 1995, the Catalogue for the
Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (the “Catalogue”)
has served as the centerpiece of the CCP’s FDI policy.33 The
current version of the Catalogue expressly assigns over four
(observing the deceleration in FDI inflow in the late 1990s and the sentiment among
overseas investors of discouragement and determent by the perceived unfavorable FDI
environment).
30. See Shen Wei, Will the Door Open Wider in the Aftermath of Alibaba? —Placing (or
Misplacing) Foreign Investment in a Chinese Public Law Frame, 42 H.K.L.J. (PT. 2) 561, 561
(2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2320402
(“Recent years witnessed a rising chorus of complaints from the foreign business
community concerning China’s protectionist regulatory environment and increasing
hostility to foreign multinationals.”); John Lee, China’s FDI Obstacle Course, BUS.
SPECTATOR (Sept. 18, 2013, 7:37 AM), http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/
2013/9/18/economy/chinas-fdi-obstacle-course (describing the foreign investment
approval process as “labyrinthine”); OECD, FDI REGULATORY RESTRICTIVENESS INDEX
(2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm (ranking China as
the number one most restrictive of all OECD and G20 countries with respect to FDI).
31. See Hui Huang, The Regulation of Foreign Investment in Post-WTO China: a
Political Economy Analysis, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 185, 185 (2009) (suggesting that the
dual system of the general company law and the specific laws for foreign investment
enterprises is likely to persist in the foreseeable future); DANIEL M. PRICE & MICHAEL J.
SMART, PAULSON INSTITUTE, BIT BY BIT—A PATH TO STRENGTHEN US-CHINA
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (July 2013), http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/media/102532/
bit_by_bit_pricesmart_english_final.pdf (illustrating the incompatibility between the
US requirement of providing equal market access to domestic and non-domestic
capital and China’s FDI restrictions in the context of the ongoing US-China bilateral
investment treaty negotiation).
32. See Simon Luk, Certain Recent Entrepreneurial Responses to China’s Mergers &
Acquisitions Rules, SIMON LUK’S ARTICLES BLOG, http://simonlukarticles.blogspot.com/
2009/05/certain-recent-entrepreneurial.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2013) (“The
Chinese government may impose tighter control over M&A activities involving Chinese
entrepreneurs in order to preserve stability in both its foreign exchange policy and
national capital account.”); Bath, supra note 15, at 32 (observing the pressure from
“popular resistance to foreign takeover of well-regarded Chinese companies”).
33. See Shen, supra note 27, at 516 (“The Catalogue signaled the state policies in
attracting foreign investment.”); Li Wanqiang, Chinese Foreign Investment Laws: A Review
from the Perspective of Policy-oriented Jurisprudence, 19 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 35, 37 (2011)
(indicating the central importance of the industry-based FDI guidance catalogue).
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hundred industry sectors into three categories, designating nonPRC investments as either “encouraged,” “restricted,” or
“prohibited,” respectively.34 Non-PRC investments in sectors not
specifically listed in the Catalogue are considered “permitted.”35
Those investments placed in a “restricted” category require
government approval, which usually involves a complex and
opaque process.36 Finally, those in the “prohibited” category are
technically forbidden under PRC law.37 Notably, the Internet
and value-added telecommunications services sectors, where the
VIE structure is prevalently used, are categorized as
“prohibited,” disallowing non-PRC ownership.38
34. See Waishang Touzi Chanye Zhidao Mulu (外商投资产业指导目录) [Catalogue
for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries] (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. &
Reform Comm’n, and the Ministry of Com. (“MOFCOM”), Dec. 24, 2011, effective Jan.
30, 2012) (China); Jane Bu et al., China’s New Foreign Investment Catalogue Comes into
Effect, MORRISON FOERSTER 1 (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/
Images/120130-Foreign-Investment-Catalogue.pdf (“‘Encouraged,’ ‘restricted[,]’ and
‘prohibited’ projects are expressly enumerated in the Catalogue.”).
35. See Jane Bu et al., supra note 34, at 1 (“Projects that are not specified in the
Catalogue fall under the ‘permitted’ category by default.”); J. Gray Sasser, China Risk
Factor Hiding in Plain View: A Brief Analysis of Variable Interest Entities (VIEs) Under Chinese
Law, TENN. CORP. NEWSL. (Nov. 2012), available at http://www.frostbrowntodd.com/
resources-1527.html (“Investments in industries not specifically listed in the Catalogue
is considered ‘permitted’ . . . .”).
36. See Bath, supra note 15, at 11 (“Despite the substantial amount of material
issued by the government in the form of regulations, policies and guidelines, the
approval process is still to a large extent non-transparent.”); China Revises Foreign
Investment Guidance Catalogue, CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA (Apr. 10, 2012),
http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/china-revises-foreigninvestment-guidance-catalogue (calling the approval process discretionary and nontransparent, and providing the PRC government the opportunity to “retaliate against
foreign investors which have raised the ire of authorities”).
37. See CHUNLAI CHEN, The Evolution and Main Features of China’s FDI Laws and
Policies, in FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA: LOCATION DETERMINANTS, INVESTOR
DIFFERENCES AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS 33, 60 (2011) (“Foreign direct investment in
prohibited industries by any foreign investors is not allowed at all.”); China Business
Center—Encouraged, Permitted, Restricted and Prohibited Industries, LEHMAN BROWN
http://www.lehmanbrowncpa.com/en/resources/class_view.asp?id=509 (last visited on
Jan. 28, 2014) (“Investment in ‘prohibited’ industries is completely off limits to foreign
investment.”).
38. See Steve Dickinson, VIEs in China. The End of a Flawed Strategy., CHINA L. BLOG
(Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2011/10/vies_in_china_the_end_of_
a_flawed_strategy.html (stating that direct foreign ownership in the internet sector is
prohibited); Greg Pilarowski, Tudou IPO Exposes Yet Another China Risk Factor: The
Founder’s Wife, VENTURE BEAT (Aug. 19, 2011), http://venturebeat.com/2011/08/19/
tudou-ipo-exposes-yet-another-china-risk-factor-the-founder%E2%80%99s-wife (noting
that all US-listed Chinese internet companies use a VIE structure).
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B. From China-China-Foreign to Variable Interest Entity: The Rise of
Variable Interest Entity as the New Workaround
As the Chinese saying goes, “The law is strong, but the
outlaws are ten times stronger.” 39 In 1994, China United
Network Communications Group Co., Ltd. (“China Unicom”), a
state-owned telecommunications operator, invented and utilized
what is referred to as the China-China-Foreign (“CCF”)
structure to circumvent FDI prohibitions in the sector.40 CCF
allowed non-PRC investors to gain equity-like benefits via a joint
venture arrangement without outright violation of the PRC’s
investment prohibition. 41 Within three years, China Unicom
raised at least US$1.4 billion, or seventy-two percent of its total
funding, through the CCF structure. 42
Unexpectedly, in October 1998, the PRC government
issued a report declaring the CCF structure “irregular” and

39. 道高一尺，魔高一丈; see also Wu Zhong, Dark Days for China’s Whistleblowers,
ASIA TIMES (Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KC26Ad01.html
(referencing the proverb).
40. See CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure, supra note 6, at 3 (“China
Unicom attempted to use the China-China-Foreign structure . . . in 1994 to directly
circumvent the Ministry of Information Industry’s . . . prohibition of FDI in the telecom
services sector.”); China Legal Developments Bulletin, BAKER & MCKENZIE 9 (Jul.-Sept.
2009),
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Supporting%20
Your%20Business/Recommended%20Reading/nl_china_legaldevelopmentsbulletin_
julsep09.pdf (explaining that the structure is called China-China-Foreign, because it
typically involves a Chinese operating company, a Chinese company with the
appropriate license, either a wholly owned foreign subsidiary or a joint venture
between a Chinese and a foreign company, and a foreign parent company. The foreign
company or subsidiary supplies the capital and technology required by the local
company); Shen, supra note 27, at 517 (“In the 1990s, foreign investors made great
efforts to sneak around the law restricting the involvement of foreign investment in the
telecoms industry. . . . China Unicom was the first Chinese entity that used the CCF
structure.”).
41. See Scott Yunxiang Guan, China’s Telecommunications Reforms: From Monopoly
Towards Competition, Part 2, 9 ASIAN ECON. & POL. ISSUES 11 (2003) (explaining the
complex three-way management contracts between the PRC operator, the joint venture
entity, and the non-PRC investor); INFORMATION GATEKEEPERS INC., CHINATELECOM
2000 V.6: NEW TELECOM POLICY AND STRUCTURE AFTER REORGANIZATION 58, exhibit
2.5 (1999) (demonstrating graphically the CCF joint venture structure).
42. IGI CONSULTING INC., supra note 41, at 57; see Shen, supra note 27, at 517
(“From 1995 to 1999, China Unicom executed around 46 cooperative projects in the
form of CCF structure, including projects with French Telecom and Japan’s NTT, and
involved planned investments totaling US$1.5 billion and actual investments of US$1
billion.”).
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called for its ban.43 A dramatic disintegration of the structure
ensued. 44 Although CCF had been utilized by a few dozen
telecom businesses for several years without official intervention,
the report made clear that the CCF was nevertheless
unacceptable under the PRC law.45 Many non-PRC investors who
had previously interpreted the CCP’s administrative silence as its
tacit approval of the investment structure were surprised by this
sudden move.46 As a result, some of the CCF investors incurred
considerable losses on their investment pursuant to the
prohibition of the structure.47
For many PRC companies and non-PRC investors, however,
the CCF experience did not stop them from looking for other
regulatory loopholes and engineering new ways to circumvent

43. China VIE Structure for Foreign Investment Under Attack from Multiple Directions:
Will It Emerge (Relatively) Unscathed or Is Its Very Survival Threatened?, HOGAN LOVELLS
(Jan. 2012), http://www.hoganlovells.com/newsmedia/pubDetail.aspx?publication=
7669; Ian Macintosh, Regulating the New Economy: Implications of WTO Accession for
Telecommunications and E-Commerce in China, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM 263, 266 (Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003)
(“[I]n October 1999, the MII announced that the CCF project contracts were
‘irregular’ under state policy and regulation.”).
44. See Robert Lewis, Investors at the Gate, 26 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 36, 36 (2007)
(noting the “spectacular and well-publicized demise” of the CCF structure); Leontine
D. Chuang, Comment, Investing in China’s Telecommunications Market: Reflections on the
Rule of Laws and Foreign Investment in China, 20 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 509, 510 (1999)
(calling the birth, development, and demise of the CCF structure an ill-fated and a
perfect example of the lack of clarity in the PRC’s investment law).
45. See Philip Sohmen, Taming the Dragon: China’s Efforts to Regulate the Internet, 1
STAN. J. E. ASIAN AFF. 17, 23 (2001), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/
journal1/china1.pdf (“[The CCF structure] had been sanctioned at the highest level,
but in 1998 the MII announced suddenly that such investment was in fact illegal, as it
was equivalent to equity ownership.”); CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure
supra note 6, at 3 (explaining that CCF was unacceptable “because FDI in the basic
telecom service sector . . . was, and remain[ed], prohibited”).
46. See Yuka Kobayashi, The Impact of the World Trade Organization on China’s Trade
Policy, in CHINA’S FOREIGN TRADE POLICY: THE NEW CONSTITUENCIES 143, 157 (Ka
Zeng ed., 2007) (noting that the PRC authority changed its attitude from turning a
blind eye to tightening control); IGI CONSULTING INC., supra note 41, at 57 (“[M]any
foreign companies are surprised by the Chinese government’s sudden move.”).
47. See Kobayashi, supra note 46, at 157 (indicating that the total loss suffered by
non-PRC investors in the CCF aftermath was likely substantial); Lynnette Luna, CCF
Investors in China May Not Go Quietly, RCR WIRELESS (Aug. 23, 1999), http://
www.rcrwireless.com/article/19990823/sub/ccf-investors-in-china-may-not-go-quietly
(“‘You won’t find very many happy investors. . . . They are going through turmoil and
uncertainty. They have to negotiate a way out of these deals.’”(quoting Hui Pan, chief
economist with IGI Consulting in Boston)).
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FDI restrictions.48 Soon after the CCF structure was invalidated,
the Sina Corporation, a major Chinese Internet company,
pioneered the VIE structure with its initial public offering
(“IPO”) on the NASDAQ.49 In contrast with CCF’s equity-based
joint venture arrangement, the VIE structure simulates the
effects of ownership exclusively by contracts, without acquiring
an actual equity interest in the PRC business.50
The VIE structure, in its most basic format, involves three
entities: a US exchange-listed entity domiciled in an offshore
financial center, typically the Cayman Islands (“ListCo”), a
Wholly Foreign-Owned Entity domiciled in PRC (“WFOE”), and
a company with operating business domiciled in the PRC
(“OpCo”).51 US investors purchase equity in the ListCo, which
owns one hundred percent of the WFOE. 52 To establish a
connection between the ListCo and the OpCo, the WFOE
typically executes five essential contracts with the OpCo and its
PRC owners.53 These contracts include: (1) a loan agreement,

48. See China VIE Structure, supra note 43, at 1 (noting that after the CCF structure
was declared “irregular,” other workarounds have “since re-emerged in various forms
and guises”); Q+A-Variable Interest Entities in China, REUTERS (Sept. 23, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USL3E7KJ1AU20110923 (describing the VIE
as “a structure lawyers devised to permit foreign investors to get around Chinese rules
barring foreigners from owning certain domestic enterprises”).
49. See Gillis, supra note 8, at 3 (noting the emergence of the VIE structure in
2000); Barboza, supra note 10 (citing Sina as the first one to use the VIE structure).
50. See Paul Gillis, Explaining VIE Structures, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Mar. 20, 2011),
http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/explaining-vie-structures.html
(“The
concept that underpins a VIE structure is that control is obtained through legal
agreements rather than through share ownership.”); Lawrence, supra note 6 (stating
that VIE allows non-PRC investors to set up agreements to mimic equity ownership).
51. See David Roberts & Thomas Hall, O’Melveny & Myers Publishes Paper on VIE
Structures in China: What You Need to Know, O’MELVENY & MYERS 1–3 (Oct. 2011),
http://www.omm.com/files/Uploads/Documents/VIE%20Structures%20in%
20China%20-%20What%20You%20Need%20to%20Know.pdf
(analyzing
the
components of a basic VIE structure); CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure,
supra note 6, at 1–3 (examining the typical VIE structure).
52. See CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure, supra note 6, at 2 (noting
that the offshore ListCo owns or controls the onshore WFOE); Roberts & Hall, supra
note 51, at 1 (describing the step where the offshore holding company forms a whollyowned subsidiary in the PRC).
53. See Roberts & Hall, supra note 51 (listing call option agreement, equity pledge
agreement, voting rights agreement, loan agreement, exclusive service agreement and
asset licensing agreement as common agreements comprising a VIE arrangement);
China VIE Structure, supra note 43 (identifying cooperation agreement, voting proxy,
equity pledge agreement and option agreement as contractual instruments of control).
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which capitalizes the OpCo by channeling the ListCo’s funds
through the WFOE; (2) an equity pledge agreement, where the
PRC owners of the OpCo pledge their equity to the WFOE as a
guarantee of their performance; (3) an options agreement,
which allows the WFOE to purchase the PRC owners’ equity in
the OpCo at the lowest permissible price under the PRC law; (4)
a proxy agreement, in which the OpCo’s owners delegate their
shareholder rights to the WFOE’s designee; and (5) a consulting
or technical service agreement, which appropriates all of the
OpCo’s profits to the WFOE.54 This web of contracts comprises
the VIE structure and allows the ListCo to consolidate the
income and assets of the PRC-domiciled OpCo in its financial
statements under the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
of the United States (“US GAAP”).55
The internet industry was the first to adopt the VIE
structure, with other industries quickly following suit.56 Today,
there are more than one hundred PRC-domiciled businesses
listed and traded in the United States through the use of VIE
structures, including most of the crown jewels of the PRC’s
Internet industry, such as Sina, Baidu, Sohu, and Tudou.57 Like

54. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the common
contracts comprising of a basic VIE structure).
55 . See FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 46(R):
CONSOLIDATION OF VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITIES (2003), available at http://
www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobnocache=true&blobwhere=11758
20923530&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobheadername2=Content-Length
&blobheadername1=Content-Disposition&blobheadervalue2=540473&blob
headervalue1=filename%3Daop_FIN46R.pdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs
(interpreting the primary beneficiary test for the recognition and consolidation of VIEs
under the US GAAP accounting standard); see also Paul Gillis, The Emperor’s New Suit:
ACCT.
BLOG
(Mar.
9,
2011),
http://
VIEs
in
China,
CHINA
www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/the-emperors-new-suit-vies-.html
(observing
that the “anti-Enron” accounting rule FIN 46(R) creates unintended loopholes for
PRC-domiciled VIEs).
56. See Variable Interest Entities in China, supra note 48 at 2 (“The VIE structure was
first used in the Internet sector . . . and has since spread to other industries.”); see also
Heightened Scrutiny to VIE Structures under the New M&A Rules, BLANK ROME (Nov. 2011),
http://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentID=37&itemID=2632 (“The use of VIE
structure has been widespread.”).
57. See Joy Shaw et al., China VIE Structure May Hold Hidden Risks, FIN. TIMES (Nov.
11, 2011, 12:27 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/0a1e4d78-0bf6-11e1-931000144feabdc0.html#axzz2giY4RPml (“Most of China’s well established internet
companies – Sina (NASDAQ: SINA), Baidu.com (NASDAQ: BIDU), Tudou (NASDAQ:
SOHU) among them – are listed in the US using this structure.”); see also Dickinson,
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its CCF predecessor, VIE has grown more common over the
years, presumably as lawyers, bankers, and investors have
become increasingly comfortable with the assumption that PRC
regulators have tacitly approved VIEs by virtue of their
continued non-action.58
Several factors contribute to the popularity of the VIE
structure.59 From the PRC companies’ perspective, the structure
enables them to access the funding that may otherwise be
difficult or impossible to obtain in domestic capital markets.60
The structure also proffers a shortcut to overseas investment by
eliminating the need to obtain central government approval of
cross-border acquisition of Chinese assets and equity.61 Another
consideration is the reputational boost a PRC company receives
from the prestige of being listed on a US exchange.62 From the
supra note 38, at 1 (noting that “virtually the entire Internet sector” was funded by
foreign IPOs).
58. See, e.g., CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure, supra note 6, at 3
(suggesting the widespread acceptance that the Sina/VIE model assumes the tacit
approval of the PRC regulators); see also Neil Gough, In China, Concern About a Chill on
Foreign Investments, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 2, 2013, 2:15 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/06/02/in-china-concern-of-a-chill-on-foreign-investments/?_php=true&_type=
blogs&_r=0 (musing that the general presumption of tacit approval may be based on
the justification that “such investment could help build corporate champions and
create jobs”).
59. See, e.g., Barboza, supra note 10, at 2 (“Private companies often chose this
route because they had difficulty raising capital in China, where state-run banks tend to
favor government-owned companies.”); Clare Baldwin, IPO VIEW-China Web IPO flow to
US Threatened by Crackdown, REUTERS (Sept. 23, 2011, 5:08 PM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/23/markets-stocks-ipos-idUSS1E78M1VA20110923
(“The VIE structure, which has been effective in circumventing foreign investment
rules, would not be that easy to replace. . . . So far, investors have been willing to pay
rich valuations and put up with VIEs because they have been desperate to tap into
Chinese Internet growth.”); supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the
popular position taken by VIE underwriters and deal lawyers).
60. See Barboza, supra note 10; Csordas, supra note 27, at 382–83 (noting that
companies sometimes resort to loansharking as an alternative financing method).
61. See Guanyu Waiguo Touzizhe Binggou Jingnei Qiyede Guiding (关于外国投资
者并购境内企业的规定) [Provisions on Mergers & Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises
by Foreign Investors (also known as “Circular 10”)], (promulgated Aug. 8, 2006,
effective Sept. 8, 2006) (China) (requiring approvals from MOFCOM and the China
Securities Regulatory Commission of cross-border acquisitions of Chinese assets and
equity, regardless of industry sector); Heightened Scrutiny to VIE Structures under the New
M&A Rules, supra note 56 (“[The] VIE structure [has] been used by PRC nationals to
engage in international financing for their businesses to circumvent Circular 10.”).
62. See Telis Demos et al., US Door Swings Ajar to China IPOs, WALL ST. J. (June 3,
2013, 8:32 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732442390457
8523463905850332 (“A US listing can help up-and-coming Chinese companies boost
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CCP’s perspective, the substantial economic benefit derived
from the cross-border inflow of capital through VIEs incentivizes
the CCP to leave this issue in a “legal gray area” for the time
being.63 In the US capital markets, both institutional and retail
investors are zealous about high-growth investment projects in
the PRC.64 Absent a better alternative to invest in the PRC’s
prohibited sectors, VIE has remained their investment structure
of choice.65
C. Recent Legislation, Regulation, and Treaty Negotiation by the
People’s Republic of China Affecting Variable Interest Entities
In February 2011, the State Council, the PRC’s highest
administrative organ, published the Circular by the General
their visibility in the US and enhance their prestige at home.”); see also Matthias von
Oppen & Joseph Marx, Limited to 300, 27 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 32, 32 (2008) (suggesting
that overseas listings provide PRC businesses with domestic prestige).
63. Aubin, supra note 13 (“By leaving the issue in a legal gray area, China can
attract foreign investment to bolster key sectors of the economy, while keeping the
right to clamp down when it desires.”); see Ken Davies, China Investment Policy: An
Update 7 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Working Papers on International
Investment, Jan. 2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/china/WP-2013_1.pdf
(“China remains the largest recipient of FDI among developing countries and FDI
continues to play a disproportionately large role in promoting China’s trade,
investment and tax revenue generation . . .”); see also Chris Leahy & Max Hirsch,
Variable Interest Entities: Risks and Rewards, BLACKPEAK, http://blackpeak.ehclients.
com/images/uploads/news/VIEs_in_China.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2012) (noting
that the VIE structure enables “valuable access to foreign investments and capital
markets”).
64. See Shai Oster & Dune Lawrence, Baidu Forced to Add Warnings as Regulators
Focus on China Stocks, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2013-12-15/baidu-forced-to-add-warnings-as-regulators-focus-on-china-stocks.html
(“‘On the one hand the structure is obviously risky, but on the other hand the bestperforming stocks in the world this year have been the Chinese Internet stocks, all of
which are VIEs. . . . So if you invest in them you take on more risk than you’d like, but if
you don’t invest in them your returns will fall well short of your benchmark. Plus,
investors are looking for ways to play the ‘rising Chinese consumer,’ and Internet stocks
are really the only way to do it.’” (quoting Arthur Kroeber, Beijing-based managing
director of GaveKal Dragonomics)); see also Matthew Mosk et al., US Officials: China
Refuses to Help Stop Investment Scams, ABC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/
Blotter/us-investors-lose-billions-alleged-chinese-stock-schemes/story?id=18164787
(assessing that accounting frauds involving Chinese stocks have been fueled by “a burst
of interest among US investors in putting money behind the Chinese industrial
boom”).
65. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; Heightened Scrutiny to VIE Structures
under the New M&A Rules, supra note 56 (noting that VIE has been an investment
structure of choice for non-PRC investors to navigate the grey areas of PRC FDI law).
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Office of the State Council regarding Institution of the Security
Review System for Merger and Acquisition of Domestic
Enterprises by Foreign Investors (the “Security Review Circular”
or the “Circular”).66 The Security Review Circular specifically
requires government review of those mergers and acquisitions
affecting “key technologies” that are susceptible to the “actual
control” of a non-PRC investor.67 Actual control exists when a
non-PRC investor becomes either the controlling shareholder or
the actual controller of a domestic enterprise through a
corporate transaction. 68 Specifically, the Circular emphasizes
that a proposed transaction that transfers the actual control of a
PRC enterprise’s operational or financial decision-making to a
non-PRC investor, is subject to security review.69

66. See China VIE Structure, supra note 44 (discussing the Security Review Circular
in the context of recent legislative attacks on the VIE); see also The People’s Republic
Strikes Back? China Issues National Security Review Regulations for Foreign-Funded M&A,
GREENBERG TRAURIG (Feb. 2011), http://www.gtlaw.com/News-Events/Publications/
Alerts?find=148219 (“Nearly five years after issuing the first rules on the subject, and
following several years of merger control business concentration filings, on February 3,
2011 the PRC State Council promulgated [the Circular].”).
67. Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Jianli Waiguo Touzizhe Binggou Jingnei
Qiye Anquan Shencha Zhidude Tongzhi (国务院办公厅关于建立外国投资者并购境内
企业安全审查制度的通知) [Circular of the General Office of the State Council on the
Establishment of Security Review System Regarding Merger and Acquisition of
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors] (promulgated by the Gen. Office State
Council, Feb. 3, 2011, effective Mar. 3, 2011) (China) (“The scope of security review of
mergers and acquisitions is the mergers and acquisitions by foreign investors of . . .
units concerning national security; and such domestic enterprises as . . . key
technologies . . . whose actual control right may be gained by foreign investors.”)
(unofficial translation); see New Review System for Foreign Investor M&A Deals with
Domestic Enterprises, SQUIRE SANDERS (Feb. 2011), http://www.squiresanders.com/new_
review_system_for_foreign_investor_m&a_deals_with_domestic_enterprises
(stating
that the definition of “actual control” under the Circular is extensive, which includes
de facto control despite actual equity stake).
68. See Laney Zhang, China: Security Review Rules on Foreign Mergers and Acquisitions
Published, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/
servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205402543_text (discussing the “actual control” test); see also
Wang Xing, Review of Foreign Takeovers Won’t Hurt Investment, CHINA DAILY (Feb. 17,
2011, 8:01 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-02/17/content_12029
238.htm (noting confirmation by the National Development and Reform Commission
that minority ownership would not trigger security review).
69. See New Review System for Foreign Investor M&A Deals with Domestic Enterprises,
supra note 67; see also Zhang, supra note 68 (“Acquisition of actual control applies to . . .
any other circumstance under which the actual control of a domestic enterprise’s
operational decisions, financial, personnel, and/or technology is transferred to foreign
investors.”).
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In September 2011, the PRC’s Ministry of Commerce
(“MOFCOM”), an executive agency of the State Council,
promulgated Announcement No. 53 pursuant to the Security
Review Circular (“M&A Rule”).70 Of particular relevance to VIE
structures, Article 9 of the M&A Rule reads:
With regard to the merger and acquisition of domestic
enterprises undertaken by foreign investors, the authorities
should judge whether such transaction is subject to the
security review based on the essential content and actual impact
of the transaction. Foreign investors shall not avoid M&A
security review through any means, including but not
limited to commissioned shareholdings, trusts, multi-level
investments, leases, loans, contractual control, and overseas
transactions.71

Arguably, to examine a VIE’s “actual impact” would reveal
that the structure is contingent upon US investors’ obtaining
“actual control” of the PRC business by engaging in “overseas
transactions” and exercising “contractual control.”72 Thus, the
M&A Rule may be understood as a clear indication by the CCP
that the VIE structure is designed to avoid the PRC’s regulatory
scrutiny, and that VIE investors may bear adverse consequences

70. See Zhang, supra note 68; Shen, supra note 27, at 533–34 (discussing the M&A
Rules and calling it “the most influential piece of legislation which had an immediate
and widespread effect on the VIE structure”).
71. Shangwubu Shishi Waiguo Touzizhe Binggou Jingnei Qiye Anquan Shengcha
Zhidude Guiding ( 商 务 部 实 施 外 国 投 资 者 并 购 境 内 企 业 安 全 审 查 制 度 的 规 定 )
[Announcement No. 53 of 2011 of MOFCOM Concerning the Provisions of the
MOFCOM for the Implementation of the Security Review System for M&A of Domestic
Enterprises by Foreign Investors] (promulgated by the Min. of Com., Aug. 25, 2011,
effective Sept. 1, 2011) (China) (emphasis added); see also David Yu et al., MOFCOM
Issues the Official Implementation Provisions on the Security Review Regarding Mergers and
Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, LLINKS L. OFFICES (Sept. 2011),
http://www.llinkslaw.com/shangchuan/201199130644.pdf (analyzing the “substance
over form” concept in Section 9).
72. See Gough, supra note 58 (“While variable interest entities in such cases are
technically owned by the Chinese, foreign-owned corporations maintain de facto
control through a series of contracts that can involve equity pledges, profit
assignments, purchase options and service or consulting agreements.”); see also Russell
Flannery, Is It The Twilight Of An Era For Chinese Listings In The US?, FORBES (Oct. 12,
2012, 11:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/russellflannery/2012/10/12/is-it-thetwilight-of-an-era-for-chinese-listings-in-the-u-s (“[T]he VIE structure, or variable
interest entity, allows foreign investors to achieve de facto control of a Chinese
operating business without direct equity ownership . . . accomplished by a web of
contracts.”).
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for engaging in plainly prohibited investment activities. 73
Accordingly, many experts question how much longer VIE
structures can survive under these new regulations, a critical part
of which appear to target this particular investment structure.74
The manipulability of the Rules’ loose language, the
centralization of the review and approval process, and the lack
of clarity as to the ultimate decision-making authority create
additional uncertainties to the already precarious legal status of
VIE structures. 75 Nevertheless, some experts remain
unconvinced that the M&A Rules resolve the ambiguity
definitively.76
One other recent development that could shape the future
of VIEs is the resumed negotiation of a bilateral investment

73 . See Malcolm Riddell, VIEs: How Foreigners Invest In China’s ‘Prohibited’
Industries–And The New Risks, CHINA DEBATE (Jan. 26, 2012), http://
www.chinadebate.com/2012/01/vies-how-foreigners-invest-in-chinas-prohibitedindustries-and-the-new-risks (noting that the VIE structure has helped big Internet
companies in China to raise “billions of dollars by effectively skirting Chinese
regulations that ban foreign investors from acquiring stakes in companies operating in
restricted industries”); Gough, supra note 58 (arguing that VIE takes advantage of
regulatory loopholes).
74. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 38 (“[I]t is now clear that the contractual
arrangements on which the various VIEs are based are in clear violation of Chinese law.
This renders the contracts unenforceable and makes existing VIE structures essentially
meaningless.”); see also Kathrin Hille, Foreign Internet Presence in China to Face Scrutiny,
FIN. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2011, 5:23 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/7f8645e2-d49311e0-a42b-00144feab49a.html#axzz1Wb8B6ceg (“[T]he new rules no longer allowed
the past assumption of Beijing’s ‘tacit approval’ of such vehicles.”).
75. See, e.g., Hille, supra note 74 (noting that the vague wording of the rules could
give regulators greater discretionary powers); Bath, supra note 15 (“The addition of the
security review process, which has the potential to reverse the process whereby the
ability to approve projects has been consistently delegated to the lower levels of
government, is a particularly unconstructive addition to the regulatory process, as it
adds time, complexity, and lack of transparency.”); Shaw et al., supra note 57 (citing an
unnamed MOFCOM source cautioning that “the lack of consensus on VIE partly
reflects ongoing power struggles among various regulatory agencies, which all seek to
expand regulatory authority”).
76. See New PRC Rules Establish National Security Review For M&A Transactions
KAUFMAN
&
CANOLES,
http://
Involving
Non-Chinese
Investors,
www.kaufmanandcanoles.com/news/articles/new_prc_rules_establish_national_
(last
security_review_for_m%26a_transactions_involving_non-chinese_investors.htm
visited Feb. 26, 2014) (contending that the language of the M&A Rule is too ambiguous
for one to determine whether the VIE falls within its regulatory scope); Dickinson,
supra note 38 (“Many foreign investors contend that existing VIE structures are sound
and that VIE arrangements can safely be used in the future.”).
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treaty between the United States and the PRC. 77 This is a
promising sign, indicating that the PRC might soon open more
sectors to equity investments from the United States. 78 A
successfully negotiated treaty could entirely eliminate the need
for the VIE structure and its associated investment
uncertainties.79 Having said that, it is too early to tell whether
and when such a treaty will come to fruition.80 Moreover, even if
the two governments eventually reach an agreement, any
opening of the restricted sectors will likely occur gradually over
time.81

77. See, e.g., Betsy Bourassa, U.S. and China Breakthrough Announcement on the
Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiations, U.S DEPT. TREASURY (July 15, 2013), http://
www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/U.S.-and-China-Breakthrough-Announcement.aspx; see also Annie Lowrey, U.S. and China to Discuss Investment Treaty, but Cybersecurity
Is a Concern, N. Y. TIMES, July 11, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/12/world/
asia/us-and-china-to-discuss-investment-treaty-but-cybersecurity-is-a-concern.html?_r=0
(noting that the BIT may potentially open a vast number of sectors to investments from
the other side).
78. See Bourassa, supra note 77 (“This [negotiation] marks an important step in
opening China’s economy to U.S. investment by eliminating market barriers, and
leveling the playing field for American workers and businesses.”); He Wei, US-China
Trade Talks a “Turning Point” in Relations, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 24, 2013), http://
usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-10/24/content_17054413.htm (suggesting that
the BIT talk may be the most important trade negotiation since the WTO talks).
79 . See Bourassa, supra note 77 (noting that the current negotiation effort
“represents the first time that China has agreed to negotiate a BIT that includes all
stages of investment and sectors”); Ian Talley & William Mauldin, U.S., China to Pursue
Investment Treaty, WALL ST. J. (July 11, 2013, 8:06 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424127887324425204578599913527965812 (suggesting that a deal
“could open up more than 100 Chinese industries to investment by US businesses”).
80. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 19, at 21 (arguing that the prospects of a SinoUnited States BIT are “rather bleak,” partly because it is doubtful that China would
agree to the US demand of market access, and partly because of the growing
protectionism pressure in the US); Simon Denyer, Amid Attacks by Chinese Government
and Media, Foreign Companies Get Mixed Signals, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2013, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/amid-attacks-by-chinese-government-andmedia-foreign-companies-receive-mixed-signals/2013/08/09/b02eea48-00d6-11e38294-0ee5075b840d_story.html (expecting the negotiations to be “long and tortuous”).
81. Compare Lester Ross et al., Prospects for Further Market Access and Protections in
China: US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty Developments, WILMERHALE (Oct. 4, 2013),
http://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=
10737422352 (emphasizing the significance of the PRC’s willingness to adopt a
“negative list” approach, which should afford non-discrimination and other protections
of BIT to all sectors, absent negotiated exceptions), with Yu Ran, FTZ’s “Negative List”
Policy to Be Modified, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 16, 2013, 9:42 AM), http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/shanghaifreetradezone/2013-11/16/content_
17109879.htm (reporting that the “negative list” approach currently tested in the
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D. Role of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission in
Regulating Variable Interest Entities Listed in the United States
All publicly-held companies in the United States, including
VIEs, are subject to the regulation of the SEC.82 The SEC was
created in wake of the Great Depression by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.83 Its core mission is “to protect investors,”
“maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets,” and “facilitate
capital formation.”84 One of the SEC’s primary responsibilities is
to oversee and improve the quality of corporate disclosure to
help the investing public make informed investment decisions.85
Public companies are required to disclose all material
information in periodic filings with the SEC, and may be subject
to securities liabilities for material misrepresentation or
omission. 86 Information is considered material if there is “a
Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone is expected to be rolled out at a slow and conservative
pace).
82 . See US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), DELOITTE, http://
www.iasplus.com/en/resources/regional/sec (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) (“In the
United States, the public capital markets are regulated primarily by the US Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), a national government agency.”). See generally The
Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates
Capital Formation’ U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.
shtml#intro (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) [hereinafter The Investor’s Advocate]
(emphasizing the requirement for public companies to file periodic reports with the
SEC, which ensures that the investing public have equal and timely access to important
corporate information).
83. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2012) (“There is
hereby established a Securities and Exchange Commission . . . .”); The Investor’s
Advocate, supra note 82, at 3 (chronicling the historical background in which the SEC
was born).
84. See Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of
the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
367, 368 (2008) (“Historically, the SEC’s mission has focused on investor protection.”);
see also The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 82, at 1 (stating the mission).
85. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984) (identifying the disclosure requirement
as one of the two basic component of the US securities law); see also The Investor’s
Advocate, supra note 82, at 1 (explaining that the SEC “requires public companies to
disclose meaningful financial and other information to the public” in order to make
sure that “all investors, whether large institutions or private individuals, should have
access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, and so long as they
hold it”).
86. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2014) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . (b)
[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading . . . .”); Steven M. Davidoff, In Corporate
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substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available.”87 The materiality of VIE risks seem undisputed, as
they are typically disclosed as “risk factors” in the filings.88 It
seems, however, that investor awareness of the substantial VIE
risks may still be inadequate as a result of this disclosure
practice.89
II. ASSESSMENT OF INVESTMENT RISKS
While the VIE structure has been used to evade the PRC’s
FDI restrictions for over a decade, it remains “a matter of
dubious legality, enforceability and sustainability.”90 Observers
Disclosure, a Murky Definition of Material, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2011, 5:57 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/in-corporate-disclosure-a-murky-definitionof-material (explaining that public companies in the United States must periodically
file reports disclosing all material information with the Securities and Exchange
Commission).
87. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 225 (1988) (expressly adopting the
standard of materiality articulated in TSC Industries v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976)); cf. Davidoff, supra note 86 (characterizing the materiality standard is
subjective, which “allows lawyers and others to argue that something is not material
because they didn’t think it was certain or important enough to affect the stock price of
the company significantly”).
88. See Dickinson, supra note 38 (recognizing that companies clearly describe in
their filings details about the VIE structure of their business, such that as a practical
matter, it may be difficult to claim that such risks are not disclosed); Paul Gillis, VIE
Disclosures are Pathetic, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Jan. 14, 2012), http://
www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/vie-disclosures-are-patheti.html (observing that
the current state of VIE risk disclosure does not rise to the standard set by the rules
adopted by the Financial Accounting Standard Boards in 2009).
89. See Steve Denning, Big Banks and Derivatives: Why Another Financial Crisis is
Inevitable, FORBES (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/
01/08/five-years-after-the-financial-meltdown-the-water-is-still-full-of-big-sharks (“Ever
heard of ‘variable interest entities’ aka VIEs? If not, you are not alone.”); Thomas B.
Hatch et al., China’s Forbidden Investment: Emerging Legal Risks for Investors Who Deal with
Chinese Variable Interest Entity (VIE) Structures, ROBINS, KAPLAN, MILLER & CIRESI LLP
(Mar.
1,
2012),
http://www.rkmc.com/resources/articles/china-s-forbiddeninvestment (describing the claim in the Orient Paper lawsuit that while the VIE
contractual arrangement is disclosed in the Form 10-K filing, the disclosure was so
buried that it did not adequately inform the shareholders).
90. Shen, supra note 30, at 570 (“[T]he recent Alipay case reaffirmed that the VIE
structure, having an ad hoc character, is a matter of dubious legality, enforceability and
sustainability.”); see Ashley Lee, Paul Gillis: VIEs No Longer Viable, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (July
18, 2013), http://www.iflr.com/Article/3232709/Paul-Gillis-VIEs-no-longer-viable.html
(discussing the VIE’s increasingly uncertain viability).
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have called it “the single biggest ‘time bomb’” and “one of the
greatest investment frauds ever perpetrated” in the US market.91
This Part examines the two types of legal risks inherent in
the VIE structure and the limited legal recourse available to
investors. Part II.A assesses the possibility that the structure be
declared illegal or that the underlying contracts be declared
unenforceable. Part II.B explores the limited legal recourse
available under current law for US investors who lose control
over the PRC-domiciled OpCo in a VIE scheme.
A. Uncertain Legal Status
There are essentially two inherent risks in a VIE
investment. 92 While the VIE arrangement may eventually be
declared legal, valid, and enforceable by the PRC government,
the presumed validity of this structure could also prove
misguided and VIE investments could become worthless.93 Part
I.A.1 considers the possibility that the CCP summarily declares
the VIE structure illegal. 94 Part I.A.2 examines the scenario
where the underlying contracts creating the VIE structure are
found invalid and unenforceable by the PRC courts.95
91. Benjamin Wey, Avoiding Problems: How to Identify Quality China Based Companies
Listed on the U.S. Stock Exchanges, YAHOO (Feb. 3, 2011), http://voices.yahoo.com/
avoiding-problems-identify-quality-china-based-7702620.html?cat=3 (“China Based
Companies with VIE Structures Are the Single Biggest ‘Time Bombs’ in the U.S.
Markets”); Shaw et al., supra note 57 (quoting an expert’s statement that “this is one of
the greatest investment frauds ever perpetrated in the US market”).
92. See generally Stan Abrams, The VIE Meta-Narrative: Illegal vs. Invalid, CHINA
HEARSAY (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.chinahearsay.com/the-vie-meta-narrative
(differentiating the concept of the VIE investment structure being declared illegal and
that of particular VIE contracts being unenforceable); Sasser, supra note 35 (discussing
the regulatory risk of the PRC government’s outlawing the structure and the
operational risk of bifurcating ownership and control); Steven M. Davidoff, Fraud
Heightens Jeopardy of Investing in Chinese Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2012, 5:40 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/fraud-heightens-jeopardy-of-investing-inchinese-companies (noting the two ways a VIE investment could go wrong).
93. See Davidoff, supra note 92 (describing two ways VIE structure may collapse).
94. See Davidoff, supra note 92 (“The problem with [VIE] is that it may be illegal
under Chinese law and has been criticized by Chinese regulators.”). But see
Schindelheim, supra note 4, at 196 (noting that the PRC government has tolerated the
VIE structure since birth and not declared it illegal).
95. See Davidoff, supra note 92 (“Even if it is legal, if the Chinese owners decide to
go rogue, the United States-listed entity must sue and obtain a judgment from a
Chinese court to enforce these dubious contracts. Good luck with that. Such a litigation
can take a long time to resolve, if ever.”); Schindelheim, supra note 4, at 220 (“[A]s the
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1. Legality of the Structure
Some commentators argue that various political
calculations, including pressure from the international capital
markets, make it unlikely that the VIE structure would be
summarily invalidated.96 Indeed, the PRC government appears
to have been hesitant to make a definitive statement on the
legality of VIEs, as the Chinese economy continues to benefit
from keeping the VIE window open.97 Notwithstanding the lack
of clarity on the issue, recent PRC administrative actions on both
the local and national levels support the contention that a
general nullification of the VIE vehicle is increasingly likely.98
At the local government level, certain provincial authorities
have banned the formation of new VIEs.99 In March 2011, Hebei
foreign parent company only controls the VIE through potentially unenforceable legal
agreements, it is possible that the domestic VIE shareholders could breach the
agreements and take the VIE and licenses, which would force the parent company to
sue to enforce the controversial contracts in PRC and non-PRC courts.”).
96. See Bill Bishop, Bloomberg Keeps VIE Fears Alive: China Companies Evading Rule
With US Listings Stump Regulators, DIGICHA (Oct. 10, 2011), http://digicha.com/
index.php/2011/10/bloomberg-keeps-vie-fears-alive-china-companies-evading-rulewith-u-s-listings-stump-regulators/ (“[S]o many powerful interests have financial stakes
in VIEs that it would be career suicide or worse for a Chinese bureaucrat to destroy this
structure on a wholesale basis.”); Fredrik Öqvist, Consolidating Recent Opinions on VIEs,
CHINA FIN. (Oct. 10, 2011), http://zhongguojinrongblog.wordpress.com/2011/10/
10/consolidating-recent-opinions-on-vies (“[T]he risk of a general government
clampdown on listed VIEs is extremely unlikely . . . .”).
97. See Daniel Goodman, Is China Really About To Clamp Down On The Corporate
Structure Used For Big American IPOs?, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 21, 2011), http://
www.businessinsider.com/will-china-really-clamp-down-on-vies-2011-9 (“Until recently,
the government has largely ignored the use of VIEs because it was either not aware,
didn’t care, or found the activity useful at the time.”); Schindelheim, supra note 4, at
197 (“[I]t is likely that the continued uncertainty is a deliberate policy of the Chinese
government to selectively facilitate foreign investment in particular industries while
limiting foreign equity ownership.”).
98. See, e.g., Tom Shoesmith, The Future of VIEs in China, PILLSBURY WINTHROP
SHAW PITTMAN, https://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/2012VIEsandthe
FutureofInternetRelatedInvestmentinChinav5.pdf (noting that the internet and valueadded telecom sectors are closed to foreign investment); Robert Lewis, China Watch: A
Foreign Lawyer’s View from the Inside, LAWYER (Oct. 19, 2011), http://
www.thelawyer.com/china-watch-a-foreign-lawyers-view-from-the-inside/1009862.article
(“The elephant in the room is that the relevant regulators could step back, look at the
structure in the entirety, collapse it down to its essentials and declare it to be in
violation of the applicable foreign investment restrictions and close it down.”).
99. See CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure, supra note 6, at 9 (noting
that Buddha Steel’s withdrawal from its US IPO after certain statements were made by
the local authorities has raised concerns among investors); Buddha Steel Inc., Report,
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provincial authorities banned Buddha Steel from forming a VIE
with a local steel plant, stating that the structure “contravene[d]
current Chinese management policies related to foreigninvested enterprises” and was “against public policy.” 100 The
announcement prompted Buddha Steel to withdraw from its
IPO process on the NASDAQ.101 Practitioners generally view the
incident as limited to this locality, and not necessarily reflective
of a definitive trend in national policy.102 Yet, other observers
have suggested that the CCP could take a case-by-case approach
and effectuate systemic changes in a piecemeal fashion.103 In any
event, the restrictions on VIE structures imposed by the Hebei
province demonstrate the fundamental vulnerability of VIE
under the PRC’s regulatory scrutiny.104

(Form 8-K) (Mar. 28, 2011) (“In March 2011, Baosheng Steel was advised by local
governmental authorities in Hebei Province of the People’s Republic of China that the
Control Agreements contravene current Chinese management policies related to
foreign-invested enterprises and, as a result, are against public policy.”).
100. Thomas M. Shoesmith, PRC Challenge to Variable Interest Entity Structures?,
PILLSBURY 2 (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/
ChinaAlertPRCChallengetoVIEStructures_03_31_11pdf.pdf (“In March 2011, however,
the local government authorities in Hebei Province apparently advised the operating
company that the VIE agreements ‘contravene current Chinese management policies
related to foreign-invested enterprises and are against public policy.’”); Buddha Steel
Inc., Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 28, 2011).
101 . See supra note 100 and accompanying text (describing Buddha Steel’s
withdrawal from IPO after decree by Hebei provincial authority).
102. See, e.g., Shoesmith, supra note 100, at 1 (considering the Buddha Steel
incident as “most likely, a ‘one-off’ event driven by local facts and circumstances”);
CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure, supra note 6, at 9 (“We are inclined to
view Buddha Steel’s IPO withdrawal as a case of a local government using China’s legal
grey areas surrounding the VIE Structure to further its own self interest.”).
103. See JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF CHINESE
LAW, ITS NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT 43 (1999) (discussing the PRC’s piecemeal
approach to lawmaking in order to cater to the fast-changing realities in the context of
Deng’s economic reform); Dan Harris, Buying into a China VIE. What Me Worry?, CHINA
L. BLOG (June 17, 2013), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2013/06/buying-into-a-chinavie-what-me-worry.html (citing that the Chinese government likes to “boil its frogs
slowly, not all at once” and that VIEs are on the wrong side of where China wants to be
going).
104. See Yingxi Fu-Tomlinson & Niping Wu, What the Future Holds for China’s VIE,
KAYE SCHOLER (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.kayescholer.com/news/publications/
What-the-Future-Holds-for-Chinas-VIE-25September2012
(emphasizing
“the
underlining vulnerability of the VIE structure when facing regulatory scrutiny in
China”); Who Owns What?, ECONOMIST, July 7, 2011, http://www.economist.com/
node/18928526 (noting the anxious debate following the Buddha Steel incident).
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On the national level, the central CCP leadership has also
addressed the use of VIE structures in a few instances.105 The
actions by the central government, to the extent that they
suggest directions of national policy, may be more alarming
than those by provincial authorities. 106 Notably, in a recent
pronouncement, the MOFCOM expressly referenced and
disapproved of the use of the VIE structure for the first time.107
In August 2012, the MOFCOM approved the acquisition of a
majority stake of Yihaodian, a PRC online retail business, by
Walmart, a US multinational retail corporation, with the express
condition that Walmart must not engage in Yihaodian’s valueadded services through the VIE ownership structure.108
2. Validity of the Contracts
Aside from a possible categorical invalidation of the
investment structure, US investors could lose their investments if

105. See K&L GATES, supra note 12, at 3 (giving an overview of the recent
government actions indicating stricter regulation of VIEs); Gao Yuan, China Approves
Wal-Mart Control of Yihaodian, XINHUANET (Aug. 14, 2012), http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/business/2012-08/14/c_131784990.htm
(“Wal-Mart
must not engage in value-added services operated by Yihaodian through the variable
interest entity (VIE) ownership structure, according to the ministry.”).
106. Cf. supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the view that the
singular provincial government fiat in the Buddha Steel incident likely does not reflect
trend in national policy).
107 . See Michael Han, MOFCOM Conditionally Clears Wal-Mart’s Acquisition of
Yihaodian, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER (Aug. 30, 2012), http://
www.freshfields.com/en/knowledge/MOFCOM_Conditionally_Clears_Wal-Mart_
Acquisition_of_Yihaodian/?LangId=2057 (calling the pronouncement “the first time
that MOFCOM has explicitly prohibited the use of a VIE structure when imposing a
remedy”); Yingxi Fu-Tomlinson & Steven Wright, MOFCOM’s Conditional Approval of
Wal-Mart’s Acquisition – What Does it Mean for Wal-Mart and Yihaodian and for the Future of
the VIE Structure?, KAYE SCHOLER (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.kayescholer.com/news/
publications/MOFCOMs-Conditional-Approval-of-Wal-Marts-Acquisition-What-does-itMean-for-Wal-Mart-and-Yihaodian-and-for-the-Future-of-the-VIE-Structure27September2012/_res/id=sa_File1/Fu-Wright-China-Legal-Article-09272012.pdf
(stating that it was the first time that the MOFCOM has specifically mentioned the use
of the structure in a formal ruling).
108. See Gao, supra note 105; see also Susan Ning et al., MOFCOM Approved WalMart’s Acquisition of Controlling Stake in Yihaodian But Said NO to VIE Structure, KING &
WOOD MALLESONS (Aug. 20, 2012), available at http://www.mondaq.com/x/193552/
M+A+Private%20equity/MOFCOM+Approved+WalMarts+Acquisition+of+Controlling+
Stake+in+Yihaodian+but+Said+NO+to+VIE+Structure (noting that the MOFCOM
imposed the VIE prohibition as one of the three conditions of the acquisition).
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the contractual foundation of VIEs collapse under manipulation
by non-government parties.109
The best-known example of investors’ loss of control over a
PRC-domiciled OpCo resulting from its PRC owner’s disregard
of VIE agreements is probably the Yahoo-Alibaba dispute in
2011.110 The dispute arose when the founder and then-CEO of
the Alibaba Group, the PRC’s e-commerce giant, transferred
Alipay, a valuable subsidiary in the online payment business, to a
separate PRC company in his name.111 Meanwhile, Yahoo, the
US company which held a forty-three percent “ownership”
interest in Alibaba through a VIE arrangement, did not approve
of the transfer.112 Alibaba argued that the transfer was necessary
for Alipay to obtain a requisite payment business permit from
the PRC’s Central Bank.113 It was necessary because the PRC law
prohibited non-PRC ownership in the payment business,
whether such ownership was direct or de facto through a VIE

109. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (stating the two ways a VIE
structure may collapse).
110. See e.g., Evelyn M. Rusli, Yahoo and Alibaba Resolve Dispute Over Alipay, N. Y.
TIMES (July 29, 2011, 9:26 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/yahooand-alibaba-resolve-alipay-dispute (calling the dispute a “simmering feud” that reached
“soap opera proportions”); Paul Gillis, Alibaba and the Disappearing VIE, CHINA ACCT.
BLOG (May 16, 2011), http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/alibaba-and-thedisappearin.html (noting that the dispute was a “very public spat”).
111. See Barboza, supra note 10 (“Jack Ma, the chairman of the Chinese Internet
giant Alibaba, surprised investors last May when he acknowledged that he had
transferred the assets of the company’s online payment platform to a private company
that he controlled.”); Heightened Scrutiny to VIE Structures under the New M&A Rules,
supra note 56 (noting that the company receiving Alipay was a purely domestic
partnership unrelated to the US-listed entity); Roberts & Hall, supra note 51 (calling
Alipay “the crown jewel” of the Alibaba Group).
112. See Shaw et al., supra note 57 (noting that Yahoo’s interest in Alibaba was
based on a VIE arrangement); Nabia Damouni & Jennifer Soba, Yahoo, Alibaba Reach
Agreement on Alipay, CHINA DAILY (Jun. 2, 2011), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/
2011-06/02/content_12629254.htm (describing Alibaba as “43-percent-owned” by
Yahoo).
113. See CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure, supra note 6, at 6 (“[Jack
Ma] claimed that the spin-off was necessary because of the PBOC’s requirement to
disclose the use of a VIE Structure when applying for a Payment Business Permit . . .”);
cf. Loretta Chao & Amir Efrati, Yahoo’s China Feud Turns Ugly, Stock Falls, WALL. ST. J.
(May 14, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527487
03730804576321030705428022 (“[Alibaba, Yahoo and Softbank] agree the Alipay
transfer was done to expedite the company’s application for a necessary regulatory
license.”).
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structure.114 Alibaba also asserted that the transfer of Alipay was
entirely legal, to which Yahoo did not object. 115 The parties
eventually reached a settlement without legal proceeding, on
terms that left many Yahoo investors sorely disappointed.116
The Yahoo-Alibaba dispute was only one of a series of
recent heists that demonstrate the dependency of US investor
interests on the managerial fiats or personal affairs of OpCo’s
PRC owner-manager. 117 In April 2012, ChinaCast Education
Corporation announced that it was unable to resume normal
business operations after its ousted chairman and Chief
Executive Officer had taken hostage of the company’s corporate
seals, business licenses, and accounting records.118 Its stock was
114. See CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure, supra note 6, at 6 (“[T]he
relevant government officials have allegedly stated that they will not issue Payment
Business Permits to online payment companies that have foreign ownership, whether
directly through equity interests or indirectly through the use of the VIE Structure.”);
Julianne Pepitone, Alibaba CEO: Yahoo Should Break Itself Up, CNN (June 1, 2011, 9:57
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/01/technology/alibaba_d9_yahoo (noting
Ma’s frustration with “people who questioned his desire to follow the Chinese
regulatory law”).
115. See Gary Epstein, Yahoo-Alibaba Spat Over Alipay: Jack Ma Needs to Say More,
FORBES (May 16, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gadyepstein/2011/05/16/
yahoo-alibaba-spat-over-alipay-jack-ma-needs-to-say-more (stating that Alibaba’s CEO
Ma had no legal obligation to Yahoo); Rusli, supra note 110 (recognizing that the
dispute exposed the fact that “Yahoo’s fate in Asia is dictated by the whim of Mr. Ma”).
116. See Michael Liedtke, Yahoo Settles Alibaba Dispute, Stock Still Sinks, YAHOO
FINANCE (July 29, 2011), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Yahoo-settles-Alibabadispute-apf-4229132856.html (describing JP Morgan’s analyst note “Alipay agreement:
better than nothing, but not that great” as summing up the market’s sentiment); Rusli,
supra note 110 (noting that David Einhorn, an influential hedge fund manager,
“dumped his entire stake in Yahoo, saying in a letter to investors that this ‘wasn’t what
we signed up for’”).
117. See Davidoff, supra note 92 (citing examples of ChinaCast, Sino-Forest,
GigaMedia in addition to Alibaba); Pilarowski, supra note 38 (citing examples of
Shanghai T2 Entertainment, Buddha Steel in addition to Tudou).
118 . See ChinaCast, Open Letter from ChinaCast’s Board of Directors to
Shareholders (Apr. 2, 2012), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/open-letter-from-chinacasts-board-of-directors-to-our-shareholders145781235.html (“Ron Chan and a few other executives have chosen to unlawfully
resist their terminations by refusing to return key company property, including
corporate chops necessary to run the business in China.”); SEC Press Release, SEC
Charges China-Based Executives with Fraud and Insider Trading (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539844443#.
UwkQpoXJzxM (“The SEC alleges that ChinaCast Education Corporation’s former
CEO and chairman of the board Chan Tze Ngon illicitly transferred $41 million out of
the $43.8 million raised from investors to a purported subsidiary in which he secretly
held a controlling 50 percent ownership stake.”).
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suspended from trading on the same day and its market
capitalization plummeted from US$200 million to US$5 million
as a result of the executive’s misconduct and other related
frauds. 119 The ChinaCast episode was reminiscent of the
Gigamedia incident in 2010, in which the online gaming
company listed on the NASDAQ failed to extract profits from
the PRC-domiciled OpCo.120 There, the ousted chief executive
of the OpCo similarly breached the VIE contracts, stopped
answering to the WFOE, and refused to give up possession of the
OpCo’s corporate seals and other documents necessary for its
operation.121 Even personal affairs of the PRC OpCo’s ownermanager, such as soured marital relationship, could threaten US
investments. 122 For example, the messy divorce of Tudou’s
founder delayed and almost derailed its IPO, causing the
company and its selling shareholders potential monetary loss in
the tens of millions of dollars due to declined market
condition.123
119. See Paul Gillis, Another China Heist?, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Apr. 2, 2012),
http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/another-chinese-heist.html?utm_
source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+
Chinaaccountingblog+%28China+Accounting+Blog%29 (observing that companies
whose stock was suspended from trading like ChinaCast rarely come back from these
kinds of problems); SEC Charges China-Based Executives with Fraud and Insider Trading,
supra note 114 (noting that ChinaCast’s market capitalization dropped from US$200
million to US$5 million after the misconduct was publicly disclosed).
120. See Gillis, supra note 119 (“We have seen this movie before – Gigamedia.”);
Davidoff, supra note 92 (arguing that such fraudulent behaviors are not isolated
incidents).
121. See Lawrence, supra note 6 (“When GigaMedia tried to replace its China
head last year, he refused to step down or turn over the VIE documents and assets
necessary for GigaMedia to run its business in China . . . .”); CADWALADER,
Understanding the VIE Structure, supra note 6, at 8 (stating the WFOE’s inability to pay
dividends as a result); Davidoff, supra note 92 (“GigaMedia appears to have given up on
getting the business back.”).
122. See Pilarowski, supra note 38 (identifying “the founder’s wife” as the newest
China risk factor); Owen Fletcher, IPO Filing Exposes Tudou’s Ex-Wife Problem, WALL ST.
J. (May 3, 2011, 8:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/05/03/ipo-filingexposes-tudou%E2%80%99s-ex-wife-problem (“In the latest tale from the wild west that
is China’s Internet sector, a lawsuit between former lovers has complicated business for
online video company Tudou Holdings as it aims to list shares in the U.S.”).
123. See Lawrence, supra note 6 (noting that Tudou’s IPO was delayed by a lawsuit
in which the ex-wife of founder Gary Wei Wang claimed a share in 76 percent of the
VIE’s equity); Pilarowski, supra note 38 (“Normally, a messy divorce for the founder
wouldn’t derail an IPO, particularly when he holds only 12.7% of the company’s shares,
as was the case for Tudou. But in the world of Chinese internet companies, with
byzantine corporate structures designed to evade China’s foreign ownership

1294 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1265
Those prior incidences demonstrate the potential
consequences of misaligned interests between the PRC owners
of the OpCo and US investors in the ListCo.124 Misalignment of
interests can occur when the stock price of the ListCo is
persistently depressed, or when the OpCo no longer feels the
need for overseas financing or technology know-how.125
Furthermore, it is likely that the situations in which OpCo’s
PRC owner-manager breaches the VIE agreements, the PRC
courts would rule in favor of the PRC individuals at the expense
of US investors.126 In the high-profile Chinachem case in 2013,
the PRC’s highest court, the Supreme People’s Court,
invalidated VIE-like contracts on the ground that they inherently
subverted the Contract Law of the PRC.127 According to Article
51 of the Contract Law of the PRC, a contract is invalid when
restrictions, that is exactly what happened. . . . If the company had completed its IPO in
December 2010 and received the same revenue multiple as Youku, Tudou would have
been valued at $1,026 million, which is over $200 million more than its actual IPO
valuation.”).
124 . See Fredrik Öqvist, Who Owns What? Or, Aligning Incentives in
FIN.
BLOG
(Jul.
19,
2011),
http://
VIE Organisations,
CHINA
zhongguojinrongblog.wordpress.com/2011/07/19/who-owns-what-or-aligningincentives-in-vie-organisations (discussing incentive alignment under different OpCo
ownership structures); Robert Lewis, Foreign Investors in China Using the Variable Jnterest
Entity Structure, LAWYER (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.thelawyer.com/foreign-investorsin-china-using-the-variable-interest-entity-structure/1010207.article
(suggesting
strategies to minimize risks of misaligned incentives).
125. See Lawrence, supra note 6 (counting low share valuations as one potential
reason of misalignment of interests between the ListCo and the OpCo); Wong, supra
note 1 (“Problems arise if the Chinese partners decide they don’t want to follow the
contracts any longer because, for example, they already have the money and know-how
they were seeking, as has happened in several instances.”).
126. See I-Ching Ng, The Dark Cloud Over the Variable Interest Entity, CORP. TREAS.
(July 18, 2013), http://www.thecorporatetreasurer.com/OpinionEntry/350505,thedark-cloud-over-the-variable-interest-entity.aspx (“It is likely that Chinese courts will
find the terms and conditions typically found in the VIE contracts to be excessively
favorable towards foreign investors . . . .”); Leahy & Hirsch, supra note 63 (“In the
event of a contract dispute with a PRC national over a VIE deal, investors should ask
themselves how confident they can be that the PRC courts will uphold the validity of
complex contracts in favor of foreign investors at the expense of PRC nationals?”).
127. See Gough, supra note 58 (“In what appears to be the first time that highranking Chinese authorities have weighed in on the issue of foreign control
agreements, the court ruled that the contracts . . . were invalid . . . [as they] had clearly
been intended to circumvent China’s restrictions on foreign investment, and
amounted to ‘concealing illegal intentions with a lawful form.’”); Ng, supra note 126
(“After the decade-long legal battle . . . lawyers quickly sensed China’s supreme court
decision to nullify Chinachem’s entrustment contracts has cast a dark cloud over the
future of [VIE] structures.”).
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“there is an attempt to conceal illegal goals under the disguise
of legitimate forms.” 128 This ruling is generally considered a
rejection by the PRC’s highest judicial authority of the
assumption that PRC officials had tacitly approved the popular
VIE structure.129
In sum, given the current legal landscape, investing in VIEs
is precarious. 130 The VIE structure stands on a precarious
footing in terms of its legality at both the local and national
levels of the PRC government.131 At the same time, the PRC
courts are unlikely to uphold the validity of VIE contracts
because contracts that effectively circumvent PRC law are
unlawful under the PRC contract law.132 As a result, the value of
any VIE investment is ultimately contingent on the integrity and
goodwill of the PRC partners and, to a limited extent, external
restraints such as reputational concerns.133

128 . Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetongfa ( 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 合 同 法 )
[Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Second Sess. of
the Ninth Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 1999).
129. See Gough, supra note 59 (“This case shows that contracts used to get around
China’s foreign investment restrictions can be struck down by the courts ... Until then,
many observers had come to regard the general absence of an official response as a
sign of tacit approval.”); Vincent Mu, Thinking Long Term, CHINA L. & PRAC.
(Nov./Dec. 2013), http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/3262360/Thinkinglong-term.html (suggesting that the ruling signifies “negative attitude of the Supreme
People’s Courts towards VIEs . . . and should make investors very wary”). But see Charles
Comey et al., China VIEs: Recent Developments and Observations, MORRISON & FOERSTER,
(Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/130716-VariableInterest-Entities-China.pdf (distinguishing the ruling as one that involved entrustment
arrangement rather than the typical VIE, therefore any prediction of its implication for
VIEs is premature).
130. See supra Part II.A.1–.2 (examining the two ways that VIE structures may
collapse).
131. See supra Part II.A.1 (noting that the PRC government may outlaw the VIE
structure summarily).
132. See supra Part II.A.2 (indicating that VIE contracts may turn out to be
unenforceable when breached).
133. See Wong, supra note 1 (arguing that every VIE operates by the grace of its
Chinese partner); Don’t Bank on It, WEEK IN CHINA (Jun. 14, 2013), http://
www.weekinchina.com/msingle/?mpage=17880 (quoting the Economic Observer
which said that most VIE structures are only morally binding and offer investors little
legal protection).
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B. Investor Rights: Vindication and Enforcement
VIE investors have very limited legal recourse if disputes
materialize over their control of the OpCo.134 However, there
are three potential forums where US investors may seek to
enforce their “ownership” rights: (1) the PRC jurisdiction where
the OpCo and the WFOE are domiciled and presumably under
whose law the VIE contracts are governed; (2) the US
jurisdiction where the ListCo shares are publically listed and
traded; and (3) the intermediary jurisdiction where the ListCo is
domiciled. 135 In practice, though, the PRC may be the only
jurisdiction for a US investor to sue the OpCo or its ownermanager. 136 It seems that choice of law provisions are
inconsequential in VIE agreements, and that these contracts are
always governed by PRC law.137 Finally, even if the contracts
stipulate to a non-PRC forum, the choice may provide no better
recourse to US investors because judgments by the many nonPRC jurisdictions, including the United States, are not

134. See Dan Harris, Everything You Always Wanted to Know about China VIEs. The
Transcript, CHINA LAW BLOG (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2011/11/
everything_you_always_wanted_to_know_about_china_vies_the_transcript.html
(“[E]veryone seemed to agree that Chinese courts will not enforce the contracts on
which VIE structures are based.”); Hatch, supra note 89 (“[S]ince most U.S.-listed
Chinese companies have little or no assets in the United States, the scope of recovery
afforded by lawsuits against these companies is generally limited to these companies’
directors and officers insurance policies.”).
135. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (showing that a typical US-listed
PRC-domiciled VIE touches three types of jurisdictions: the PRC, the United States,
and the intermediary offshore financial center jurisdiction or jurisdictions).
136. See Hatch, supra note 89 (noting that the scope of recovery in a successful
VIE lawsuit in US courts is generally limited to the company’s D&O insurance); Zhang
Shouzhi et al., Forum Shopping for Dispute Resolution: Hurdles and Solutions, KING & WOOD
MALLESONS (Jan. 2010), http://www.kingandwood.com/article.aspx?id=ForumShopping-for-Dispute-Resolution-Hurdles-and-Solutions&language=en (noting that
“[m]ost countries with closest economic ties with China, such as US, Great Britain,
Canada, Japan and BVI, have not concluded civil and commercial legal assistance
treaties with China” that are required for the enforcement of judgment rendered by a
non-PRC forum state).
137. See Davidoff, supra note 92 (noting that in the event that VIE contracts are
disputed, the US-listed entity must sue and obtain a favorable judgment from a PRC
court to enforce them); Hatch, supra note 89 (observing that VIE investors suing in US
courts generally seek recovery by alleging false and misleading statements rather than
by enforcing the VIE contracts).
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enforceable in the PRC. 138 This is certainly true when such
judgment contravenes the PRC law or public policy.139
Based on the foregoing, it is problematic for US investors to
seek enforcement of their contractual rights under a VIE
arrangement by way of lawsuit in the PRC.140 First, if the CCP
declares the VIE structure per se illegal, then the contracts that
make up the structure would be void. 141 Second, absent a
categorical pronouncement by the CCP, US investors may find it
practically impossible to convince the PRC courts that the VIE
contracts, which are designed to conceal the illegal intention of
circumventing the PRC’s FDI prohibitions, should be
enforced.142 Third, the PRC courts are known for their lack of
judicial independence.143 As the PRC central authority continues
138. See Dan Harris, Suing Chinese Companies In US Courts. The Pros And The Cons,
CHINA L. BLOG (Jun. 27, 2011), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2011/06/suing_
chinese_companies_in_us_courts_the_pros_and_the_cons.html (“US judgments have
virtually no value in China.”); Peter Thorp & Huawei Sun, Arbitration Guide ei Sun,,
INT’L BAR ASSOC. 1 (Feb. 2012), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?
ArticleUid=a646cf32-0ad8-4666-876b-c3d045028e64 (“[F]oreign court judgments are
very difficult to enforce in the PRC due to a lack of mutual enforceability treaties with
other countries.”).
139. See Sun Jin & Xue Junge, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign-related
Judgment in China, ZHEJIANG XINMU L. FIRM (June 23, 2013), http://
www.xinmulawyer.com/els.asp?id=20 (“According to the provisions of article 267 and
268 in Civil Procedure Law, if foreign court’s judgment want to be recognized and
enforced by China’s court, the judgment should satisfy the following conditions: The
judgment or written order should be legally effective . . . the judgment doesn’t
contradict the basic principle of the law of People’s Republic of China, nor violate State
sovereignty, security and social and public interest of the country.”); Lily Chan,
Enforcing U.S. Court Judgments in China, AM. BAR ASSOC., http://apps.americanbar.org/
intlaw/committees/regional_comparative/china/EnforcingUSJudgementsPRC.pdf
(last visited on Feb. 26, 2014) (explaining that a non-PRC judgment is not recognized if
the PRC court determines that it violates fundamental principles of PRC law, and that
PRC courts have wide discretion in evaluating whether to enforce foreign judgments).
140. See supra Part II.A.1–.2 (examining the two ways that VIE structures may
collapse).
141. See supra Part II.A.1 (suggesting that the PRC government may declare the
structure illegal).
142. See Aubin, supra note 13 (“To the extent a VIE contract structure is designed
to circumvent the requirements of Chinese law, such contracts are void…not voidable,
void. It is as if they did not exist.”); Leahy & Hirsch, supra note 63 (“Should Chinese
VIE-owners breach contractual agreements, it is unclear whether Chinese courts would
enforce foreign investors’ rights”).
143. See Benedict Sheehy, Fundamentally Conflicting Views of the Rule of Law in China
and the West & Implications for Commercial Disputes, 26 NW. J. INT’L L & BUS. 2 (2006),
(noting that law is but a tool of the Chinese Communist Party, which alone is the “basis
of power and influence as well as the basis of all law”); Megha Rajagopalan & Ben
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to tighten control around VIEs by legislative and administrative
acts, the likelihood of a judicial ruling that safeguards the VIE
structure has substantially declined.144 As a result, lawyers have
almost never sought to enforce VIE contracts in a PRC court.145
Instead of bringing a lawsuit, US investors might pursue
alternative dispute resolution methods, such as arbitration.146
Nevertheless, arbitration in the PRC may be unlikely to yield
favorable results for non-PRC investors, for the same reasons
lawsuits in PRC are expected to fail.147 Indeed, in the two recent
Blanchard, China’s Top Court Urges Judicial Independence, End to Interference, REUTERS
(Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/29/us-china-courts-idUS
BRE99S0HB20131029 (“China must rid its courts of corruption and stop officials
interfering in decisions, a paper on reforms by the top court said on Tuesday, referring
to a judicial system that answers to the Communist Party and almost never sides with
defendants.”).
144. See supra notes 127–129 and accompanying text (explaining the recent
judicial ruling that the VIE-like structures contravene public policy and are illegal);
supra note 143 (describing the PRC courts’ lack of independence from political
influences).
145. See Leahy & Hirsch, supra note 63 (“The common theme to all of these
disputes is that none of them was resolved in a conventional litigation strategy, but
rather each was negotiated commercially.”); Shen, supra note 30, at 570 (“To date, the
VIE structure has never been tested in a PRC court and there is therefore no certainty
that the legality of such structure will be recognised or that such a structure will not
encounter regulatory scrutiny (or even a crackdown) at a later stage.”); Aubin, supra
note 13 (“Lawyers said they do not expect a rash of legal challenges to VIEs. But on the
rare occasions when VIEs are challenged, U.S. investors nearly always lose . . . ‘I’ve yet
to see a situation where shareholders have gotten their hands on Chinese assets in an
adversarial situation.’”).
146 . See Weixia Gu, Arbitration in China, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION IN ASIA 77 (Shahla Ali & Tom Ginsburg eds., 3d ed. 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2263058
(“Litigating
crossborder business disputes in [the PRC’s] national courts poses various problems and
uncertainties . . . Arbitration is today regarded as an indispensable tool designed to
afford parties engaged in international trade and investment the requisite of certainty
and confidence that rightly demand for dispute resolution in the international
transactions.”); Terence Tung, Commercial Arbitration in the People’s Republic of China,
MAYER BROWN (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/
Commercial-Arbitration-in-the-Peoples-Republic-of-China-01-19-2010 (“The [PRC] now
conducts more arbitrations than any other country and has become of one the most
important places for commercial arbitrations in the world.”).
147. See Gough, supra note 58 (“Since 2010, Shanghai’s arbitration board has
invalidated two variable interest entities that had been used by foreign companies to
control onshore businesses. In one case involving an online game company, the panel
applied China’s contract law to reach the same conclusion as the supreme court in the
Chinachem case — saying that the variable-interest entities were ‘concealing illegal
intentions with a lawful form.’”); Jiang Rongqing & Zhu Biyun, China: Recent Concerns
on Foreign Investment in China and VIE, DACHENG L. OFFICES (July 15, 2013), available at
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cases arbitrated in Shanghai, the VIE agreements were ruled as
void on the ground that they impermissibly circumvented
existing PRC law by effectively enabling overseas investments
into PRC businesses via contractual means. 148 Alternatively,
investors may seek arbitration in a non-PRC arbitration tribunal
if the VIE agreements have provided so.149 In that case, they run
the risk of relief not being enforced if the PRC courts deem the
arbitral award a violation of existing law or public policy.150
In sum, if VIE fails, by means of either PRC government
decree, managerial rift, or other operational or governance
decision, it is exceedingly difficult for US investors to use
judicial means to recover their investment losses.151 Accordingly,

http://www.mondaq.com/x/250690/international+trade+investment/Recent+
Concerns+on+Foreign+Investment+and+VIE (concluding from the two arbitration
cases that VIE contracts adopted to get around the PRC’s FDI restrictions or
prohibitions could be invalidated by either the court or the arbitration tribunal); Paul
Gillis, Is It Safe to Go Back in the Water?, CHINA ACCOUNTING BLOG (June 7, 2013, 6:54
PM),
http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/is-it-safe-to-go-back-in.html
(“[N]o one has ever succeeded in enforcing the agreements[,] and every time it has
come before a judge or arbitrator[,] the agreements have been found invalid.”).
148. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (summarizing the rulings of the
two arbitration cases).
149. See Thorp & Sun, supra note 138, at 1 (“Although the PRC court system
continues to improve, foreign companies dealing with China-related matters often
prefer to use arbitration due to their lack of familiarity with the PRC courts and the
easier cross-border enforceability of arbitral awards as compared to court judgments.”);
New York Convention Countries, N.Y. ARB. CONV, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/
contracting-states/list-of-contracting-states (last visited on Feb. 24, 2014) (identifying
China as a contracting country to the New York Convention since 1987).
150. See U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, art. V.1, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter
New York Convention] (“Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused
. . . [if] said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected
it . . . .”); Henry L. T. Chen & B. Ted Howes, “Public Policy” and the Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitration Awards in China, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Nov. 22, 2010),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f96e8738-5cfe-4e39-8d1d7a6dbfbd4c21 (discussing prior cases, including one involving contradiction to the
country’s administrative regulations, where the PRC courts applied the public policy
exception under the New York Convention). But see Thorp & Sun, supra note 138, at 21
(arguing that refusal to enforce arbitration award on public policy ground rarely
occurs).
151. See Aubin, supra note 13 (“In practice, if things go wrong, foreign investors in
a VIE may have very few legal rights . . . .”); supra notes 138, 145 and accompanying text
(suggesting that it is virtually impossible that the VIE agreements can be enforced).
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investors may have no better choice than to settle for inadequate
remedy of some sort, as in the Yahoo-Alibaba case.152
III. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Part III urges the SEC to carefully scrutinize and regulate
publicly traded, PRC-domiciled VIEs to protect US investors.153
Without action targeted at addressing the use of the VIE
structure, these entities could lead to severe losses by the US
investing public without redress. 154 Specifically, Part III
recommends that the SEC take two immediate actions to better
inform US investors of the inherent risks of VIEs. Part III.A. calls
for an investor warning through the Office of Investor
Education and Advocacy to explain the legal and regulatory risks
of the VIE structure. Part III.B recommends that risk disclosure
languages related to the unique VIE risks be more prominently
featured in SEC filings.
There are three key reasons for the United States to
implement regulatory reform to protect investors from the
damaging impact of a VIE collapse. 155 First, ex post remedy
152. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (recalling the disappointment of
Yahoo investors in Yahoo’s settlement with Alibaba); Zeng Xianwu & Bai Lihui, Variable
Interest Entity Structure in China, KING & WOOD MALLESONS (Feb. 9, 2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a9d30374-f27f-4be7-84b82a3772ee84cf (“The result [of PRC individuals or domestic company not performing
their obligations under the VIE contracts] is typically difficult, expensive and timeconsuming dispute resolution process, which may lead to some kind of settlement or,
alternatively, the foreign investor giving up on the PRC domestic company and their
presence in China.”).
153. See supra Part II.A–.B (analyzing the inherent risks of VIEs and the limited
legal recourse available to investors); Davidoff, supra note 92 (“The Securities and
Exchange Commission and Washington seem to be almost as absent. . . . The United
States government has also not pressed China to vigorously and quickly enforce its own
laws to help American shareholders.”). But see Paul Gillis, VIE Disclosures to Come to Hong
Kong, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/
weblog/vie-disclosures-to-come-to.html (“The SEC has paid great attention to the
disclosures related to VIEs and investors today have considerably more data to evaluate
the risks of these structures.”).
154 . See supra Part II.B (examining the limited legal recourse available to
investors).
155. See Steve Denning, Big Banks and Derivatives: Why Another Financial Crisis Is
Inevitable, FORBES (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/
01/08/five-years-after-the-financial-meltdown-the-water-is-still-full-of-big-sharks (“Ever
heard of ‘variable interest entities’ aka VIEs? If not, you are not alone. They are

2014]

PERILS OF INVESTING IN VIES

1301

creation is expected to produce inadequate results.156 This is
because the PRC courts and arbitrators are unlikely to uphold
and enforce VIE agreements, and may not enforce non-PRC
judgments or arbitral awards against PRC entities or
individuals.157 Additionally, there is little reason to expect that
the PRC would help recoup US investment losses or cooperate
with US regulators.158 Second, the market is unlikely to selfcorrect in time because there is an inherent conflict of
interest.159 All of the active participants in the VIE scheme have
distinct monetary incentives to prolong the appearance of
enforceable legality in order to generate transaction fees. 160
Third, the regulatory efforts to date are limited and
insufficient.161

phenomena that reside in what The Atlantic calls ‘an ever lower circle of financial hell’
than proprietary trading.”); Davidoff, supra note 92 (suggesting that the SEC is yet to
take effective action to address the VIE issue).
156. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (noting that merits of VIE
agreements have almost never been contested in PRC courts); Zeng & Bai, supra note
150 (suggesting that investors will likely settle or simply give up any claim it may have
over the PRC OpCo).
157. See supra Part II.B (concluding that US investors are unlikely to obtain
adequate recovery in VIE disputes).
158. See e.g., The SEC Shouldn’t Forget that Beijing Always Wins, CHINA ECON. REV.
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/china-on-wall-street-sec-csrcshowdown-big-four-auditors (arguing that PRC regulators will not cooperate with the
SEC in the heated dispute over the Big Four accounting firms’ China practice, partly
because they have never been enthusiastic about US investors buying into mainland
companies); Mosk et al., supra note 64 (“The Chinese government snubbed a US
request for help in cracking down on a string of alleged investment frauds that have
cost Americans billions . . . .”).
159. See Davidoff, supra note 92 (“It is not just a problem of a questionable legal
structure, but Wall Street’s apparent willingness to ignore the fact that investors in the
United States have tenuous claims when they buy shares in Chinese companies. And
underwriters and Chinese issuers have taken advantage of the hunger for Chinese
stocks.”); Dan Harris, Buying into a China VIE. What Me Worry?, CHINA L. BLOG (Jun. 17,
2013),
http://www.chinalawblog.com/2013/06/buying-into-a-china-vie-what-meworry.html (“Accountants, lawyers and stock brokers make a ton of money off IPOs so
they . . . have every incentive to keep the [VIE] structure going.”).
160. See supra note 159 (noting that the fees generated by VIEs incentivize
underwriters, brokers, accounts and lawyers to create more VIEs while they can).
161. See Fu-Tomlinson & Wu, supra note 104 (noting that the New Oriental
investigation was the first time the SEC “formally question[s] whether a VIE structure
adopted by a China-based company listed in the US provides ‘sufficient basis for
consolidation’”); Lawrence, supra note 6 (arguing that the US is still seen as “the
paradise for VIEs” due to its lax regulation over the structure).
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A. Investor Warning
The popularity of the VIE structure shares several key
attributes with the reverse merger wave of PRC-domiciled
companies in the 2000s.162 Both became popular by enabling
these businesses to access the US capital markets.163 Both involve
legal structures and financial jargon that are atypical among
public companies and confusing to the general public.164 Both
generate handsome profits for the professionals involved in the
transactions. 165 Both exist in a near “regulatory vacuum”
between the United States and the PRC.166 Most importantly,
both have caused, or have the potential to cause, substantial
losses to even sophisticated institutional investors who are

162. See Nanette Byrnes & Lynnley Browning, Special Report: China’s Shortcut to Wall
Street, REUTERS (Aug 1, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/01/us-shellchina-idUSTRE7702S520110801 (explaining reverse merger transactions which enable
PRC companies to list in the US). But see Brendan Conway, Chinese Structure for Tapping
U.S. Markets Draws Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2011, 1:16 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204138204576598843235826
866 (noting a key distinction between the VIE and reverse merger issues).
163. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting that companies favor VIE to
access overseas financing); Byrnes & Browning, supra note 162 (noting that PRC
companies use reverse merger as a short cut to list in the US).
164. See Hardy Zhu, Complex Structures for Investing in China, MATTHEWS ASIA
(Sept. 2012), http://matthewsasia.com/perspectives-on-asia/asia-insight/article-560/
default.fs (noting that PRC-based VIE entities have complex corporate legal
structures); David Barboza & Azam Ahmed, Muddy Waters Research is a Thorn to Some
Chinese Companies, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2011, 9:20 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2011/06/09/muddy-waters-research-is-a-thorn-to-some-chinese-companies
(“[T]he
Securities and Exchange Commission warned about the potential risks of investing in
reverse-merger companies, including murky financials and complicated ownership
structures.”).
165. See Walter Pavlo, Reverse Mergers – Pushers May Be the Problem, FORBES (Apr.
15, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2011/04/15/reverse-mergerspushers-may-be-the-problem (noting that profit-seeking pushers and dealers are at the
center of the troubling reverse merger transactions); supra notes 159, 160 and
accompanying text (indicating the disincentives of bankers, lawyers, and accountants to
stop VIEs in the tracks).
166. Csordas, supra note 16, at 386 (“Some have described the oversight of
‘foreign private issuers,’ including Chinese companies listed on US securities
exchanges, as a ‘regulatory vacuum,’ with neither the United States nor China
effectively monitoring those companies.”); supra note 63 and accompanying text
(arguing that the PRC government is incentivized to leave VIE in the legal gray area for
as long as it deems beneficial).
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typically presumed to understand the risks of their
investments.167
The SEC should look to past practices and issue a similar
warning it used to address the risks related to reverse merger.168
In June 2011, in response to the increasing number of securities
fraud scandals involving PRC companies that went public in the
United States via reverse merger transactions, the SEC’s Office
of Investor Education and Advocacy issued an announcement
titled “Investor Bulletin: Reverse Merger,” in which it addressed
the common risks of the companies at issue and the typical
pattern of frauds.169 The announcement prompted immediate
discussion and attention in the financial press.170
Similarly, the proposed VIE warning should analyze the
legal and regulatory risks of investing in VIEs and include
167. See supra Part II.B (analyzing the limited legal recourse available to VIE
investors who seek remedy when their investment goes wrong); M. Norman Goldberger
& Laura Krabill, Fraud Prevalent in Reverse Merger Companies with Operations in China,
BALLARD SPAHR LLP (July 8, 2011), http://www.ballardspahr.com/AlertsPublications/
Articles/2011-07-08_Fraud_Prevalent_in_Reverse_Merger_Companies_with_
Operations_in_China (“There have been enough instances of serious securities fraud
in these [reverse merger] companies (and enough instances where sophisticated
investors have been damages with no recourse) that the old adage ‘buyer beware’ is
particularly true.”).
168. See supra notes 162–67 and accompanying text (comparing and identifying
the similarities between VIEs and reverse mergers involving US-listed, PRC-based
companies); Scott Eden, SEC Warns on Reverse Merger Stocks, STREET (Jun. 9, 2011, 5:08
PM),
http://www.thestreet.com/story/11148562/1/sec-warns-on-reverse-mergerstocks.html (“The Securities and Exchange Commission put out an investor bulletin
Thursday afternoon warning the world of potential fraud among companies that came
public in the U.S. through a controversial method called a reverse merger.”).
169 . See SEC OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC. & ADVOCACY, INVESTOR BULLETIN:
REVERSE MERGERS (June 2011), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/reverse
mergers.pdf; SEC Press Release, SEC Issues Bulletin on Risks of Investing in Reverse
Merger Companies (June 9, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011123.htm [hereinafter INVESTOR BULLETIN] (“The Investor Bulletin explains the reverse
merger process, describes the potential risks of investing in reverse merger companies,
and details some of the recent enforcement actions that the agency has brought against
reverse merger companies.”).
170. See e.g., Azam Ahmed, S.E.C. Issues Warning About Reverse-Merger Stocks, N.Y.
TIMES (June 9, 2011, 2:42 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/s-e-c-issueswarning-about-reverse-merger-stocks; Michael Rapoport, Regulators Warn Investors on
‘Reverse-Merger’ Companies, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 10, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424052702304259304576375773471908358; Joshua Gallu, ‘ReverseMerger’ Stocks May Be Prone to Fraud, Abuse, SEC Says in Warning, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(Jun. 9, 2011, 2:26 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-09/-reversemerger-stocks-may-be-prone-to-fraud-abuse-sec-says-in-warning.html.
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examples of VIE-related risk disclosure language found in the
SEC filings.171 It should provide a list of incidents where US
investors have lost control of the PRC-domiciled VIEs, followed
by a brief discussion of each case.172 Finally, it should conclude
by recommending that investors be particularly cautious and
take diligent care in understanding the risks inherent in a VIE’s
corporate structure before investing. 173 Based on prior
experience, the SEC may expect the proposed announcement to
draw the immediate attention of the media.174 Increased media
coverage of the issue helps foster wider public discussion, which
in turn enhances the general understanding of and alertness to
the issue.175
B. Prioritized Risk Disclosure
As a second recommendation, the SEC should enhance the
visibility of the risk disclosure related to the unique legal and

171. See INVESTOR BULLETIN, supra note 169, at 2–3 (describing in plain English
the risks of investing in reverse merger companies and citing examples of risk factor
disclosures that reverse merger companies have used in their SEC filings); Stephen E.
Fox & Irwin Kishner, SEC Warns Investors about Investing in Reverse Merger Companies,
HERRICK FEINSTEIN LLP (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.
aspx?g=7faae2bd-5c96-40c1-8f72-b1a04af66c1e (summarizing the potential risks with
investing in reverse merger companies that were mentioned in the Bulletin).
172. See INVESTOR BULLETIN, supra note 169, at 3–4 (listing recent enforcement
actions involving reverse merger companies with brief discussion of each action); Fox &
Kishner, supra note 171 (“[The Bulletin] also discusses six reverse merger companies
that had their stock suspended from trading by the SEC in recent months, and states
that the SEC has recently revoked the securities registration of ‘several’ reverse merger
companies.”).
173. See INVESTOR BULLETIN, supra note 169, at 4 (“Investors should be careful
when considering investing in the stocks of reverse merger companies and should
make sure that they have accurate and up-to-date information about a company before
investing.”); Fox & Kishner, supra note 171 (summarizing the specific tips for investor
due diligence recommended in the Bulletin).
174. See supra note 168 (examples of major media reporting on the SEC investor
bulletin warning about investing in reverse merger companies). But see Eden, supra
note 168 (observing the critique that SEC’s warning had come too little too late).
175. See e.g., Anne-Katrin Arnold, Media Effects I: Agenda Setting, WORLD BANK
ORG. BLOG (Dec. 22, 2009), https://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/media-effectsi-agenda-setting (suggesting that the more attention media devotes to an issue, the
more important the public perceives the issue to be); Dietram A. Scheufele & David
Tewskbury, Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects
Models, 57 J. COMM. 9, 11 (2007) (noting that the characterization of an issue in the
news reports can have an influence on how it is understood by audiences).
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regulatory risks of the VIE structure.176 While companies already
disclose those material risks in technical compliance with
relevant SEC rules, the disclosure is often lengthy, difficult to
understand, and effectively buried under pages of dense,
boilerplate language. 177 As such, the current disclosure
requirement inadequately serves the SEC’s main regulatory
objective—to protect investors by ensuring that disclosures are
truly informative.178 While addressing the general inadequacies
of risk disclosure practice is an ongoing effort that requires far
more reflection and discussion, the SEC should not hesitate
from embracing effective piecemeal measures to promote
understanding of the VIE-specific risks in the interim.179
The SEC must prioritize the disclosure of VIE-specific risks
over that of generic economy or industry -wide risks through two
new reporting requirements for VIEs.180 First, the SEC should
176. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (indicating that the current state of
VIE risk disclosure is inadequate).
177. See Dickinson, supra note 38 (recognizing that companies clearly describe in
their filings details about the VIE structure of their business, such that as a practical
matter, it may be difficult to claim that such risks are not disclosed); Gillis, supra note
88 (observing that the current state of VIE risk disclosure does not rise to the standard
set by the rules adopted by the Financial Accounting Standard Boards in 2009); e.g.,
supra note 5 (regarding the Sina and RenRen 2013 annual reports, liberally referring to
“our China operations” and “our products and services” as if the OpCo is owned by the
ListCo).
178. See, e.g., HARVEY L. PITT, SEC ORAL TESTIMONY: ACCOUNTING AND INVESTOR
PROTECTION ISSUES RAISED BY ENRON AND OTHER PUBLIC COMPANIES (Mar. 21, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/032102oraltshlp.htm (stating that
“disclosure by public companies must be truly informative and timely”, “full and fair”);
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) (proclaiming the overarching objective
of the Act as “[t]o protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes”).
179. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Speech at the National Association of
Corporate Directors Leadership Conference 2013, The Path Forward on Disclosure
(Oct. 15, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/137053
9878806#.Uwn6XIXJzxM (discussing the problem of information overload rendering
disclosure ineffective and the directions of future reform based on past efforts). See
generally Arthur J. Radin, Have We Created Financial Statement Disclosure Overload?, CPA J.
ONLINE, Nov. 2007, http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2007/1107/perspectives/
p6.htm (arguing that the excessively long financial statement disclosures are
counterproductive and worrisome).
180. See Letter from Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner, US Securities and
Exchange Commission, to the SEC Staff (Feb. 21, 2014), available at http://
www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540834506#.UwoHf4XJzxM (urging
the SEC to take on such critical projects as reviewing corporate disclosure regime in
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require that risk disclosure language relating to the legal
instability and unpredictability of the VIE structure be in
boldface and italicized fonts to signal the critical importance of
the issue. 181 Second, such language should be placed at the
beginning of the risk disclosure section to reduce the likelihood
that it is overlooked by investors.182
In sum, Part III advises the SEC to institute precautionary
regulatory measures with respect to VIEs and recommends two
such measures that may be implemented in the near future.183
While US regulatory attention may cause disruptive dislocation
in the international capital markets, causing immediate
diminution of the share prices of affected entities, it ultimately
leads to a more efficient and transparent system, which in turn
promotes investor confidence in the integrity of the US capital
markets.184

2014); supra note 179 and accompanying text (suggesting that current risk disclosure
practice is ineffective and requires reform).
181 . See SEC, A PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK: HOW TO CREATE CLEAR SEC
DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 49 (Aug. 1998) [hereinafter PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK]
(noting that boldface text is common in disclosure documents); PLAIN LANGUAGE
ACTION & INFO. NETWORK, FEDERAL PLAIN LANGUAGE GUIDELINES 88 (May 2011),
http://www.plainlanguage.gov/howto/guidelines/FederalPLGuidelines/
FederalPLGuidelines.pdf (“Use bold and italics to make important concepts stand
out.”).
182. See PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK, supra note 181, at 16 (advising drafters of
disclosure documents to look through investors’ eyes in deciding where to place
information); Radin, supra note 179 (“If a company today wanted to hide information,
but technically be protected, what better place to hide it than in the footnotes to the
financial statements or in the risk factor and operations sections of the 10-K? This is
exactly what happened in the case of Enron.”).
183. See supra Part III.A–.B (discussing the two recommendations).
184. See Richard Pearson, Looking at Chinese VIE’s, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2012, 1:39
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardpearson/2012/10/18/looking-at-chinesevies/ (“If the SEC were to take broader action against all VIE structures, presumably
they would have to deal with the same implications as the Chinese government, namely
that the number of companies and the market value that they represent are enormous.
Any broad based action would cause an immediate and very substantial dislocation in
the markets.”); Simon Rabinovitch, Appetite for US-listed Chinese Stocks Transcends Audit
Dispute, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014, 2:39 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f2d07
dbe-9314-11e3-8ea7-00144feab7de.html#axzz2rqPiReYw (noting that investors are not
usually known for their long memories, and though US-listed PRC companies were an
endangered species due to exposed fraud after fraud not too long ago, their stocks
have rebounded and the market has reopened to new listings).
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CONCLUSION
PRC-domiciled VIEs are contract-based investment
structures engineered to enable non-PRC investors’ de facto
control over PRC businesses in contravention of Chinese FDI
restrictions. Contracts made to circumvent existing PRC law are
not enforceable, and the VIE structure has yet to be explicitly
approved by the CCP. Further, typical shareholder safeguards
do not protect the rights of US investors in a VIE arrangement.
By not directly addressing the legality of VIE or the validity of its
underlying contracts, the PRC government reserves for itself the
right to declare its position at a later date, creating substantial
unpredictability for US investors. The SEC is encouraged to take
immediate precautionary actions to protect US investors from
the unique and under-appreciated legal risks of investing in
PRC-domiciled VIEs.

